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THE ELUSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
Larry J. Pittman* 
Today, at any moment, many Americans are subject to having their private 
information stolen or otherwise used without their consent. This Article will dis-
cuss the specifics of a constitutional right to informational privacy theory, and a 
civil lawsuit remedy for the unauthorized governmental use of one’s private in-
formation. The Fourth Amendment is the most logical constitutional source for 
this privacy theory; and, a governmental entity, to justify its unauthorized use of 
private information, must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard by showing a com-
pelling governmental interest that cannot be satisfied by a less intrusive alterna-
tive. 
As a part of this discussion, this Article will review the Supreme Court’s 
substantive due process standards and show how they have changed such that the 
Court is less bound to a strict historical analysis of an asserted liberty interest. 
To further this due process analysis, this Article will review some of the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment cases, which show that the Fourth Amendment is the most 
logical constitutional source to support a constitutional right to informational 
privacy. 
The Article also contains a detailed analysis of the Court’s major opinions 
in this area of the law and argues that the Court, contrary to assertions in its 
most recent opinion on this subject, has previously held that there is a constitu-
tional right to informational privacy. This Article also contains a detailed discus-
sion of federal circuit courts of appeals’ opinions, which show that most federal 
circuit courts give a broader interpretation to the Court’s precedent than the 
Court does itself, and that these circuit courts are providing more leadership in 
holding that there is a constitutional right to informational privacy. And, this Ar-
ticle will conclude that the broad approach that some of the federal circuit courts 
have taken is the preferable approach, and that the Fourth Amendment and strict 
scrutiny should be used to evaluate a constitutional right to informational privacy 
claim. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been an erosion of personal privacy in this country since the ter-
rorist’s attack on 9/11,1 including the creation of the National Security Agency 
and its surveillance activities;2 enhanced scrutiny at airports and other public 
places;3 a substantial increase in the number of cameras that record many pub-
lic places;4 a possible recording of all of our cell phone and email conversa-
tions;5 and a pervasive belief by some that most of our electronic data—
including social security numbers, credit card numbers, bank records, and med-
ical records—are subject to being hacked.6 There is even a fear that our laptops, 
televisions, and other electronic devices, such as Amazon Echo, and perhaps 
Siri, are secretly spying on us by recording our actions and submitting the data 
to others without our permission.7 And, there is a fear of artificial intelligence 
where algorithms collect and manage the electronic data that we create when 
we surf and otherwise use the internet,8 with some even believing that with fu-
                                                        
1  See generally Adam Liptak, Civil Liberties Today, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2011), https://ww 
w.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/us/sept-11-reckoning/civil.html [https://perma.cc/QF26-7UHP]. 
2  See Megan Blass, Note, The New Data Marketplace: Protecting Personal Data, Electronic 
Communications, and Individual Privacy in the Age of Mass Surveillance Through A Return 
to Property-Based Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 577, 577–
81 (2015) (discussing pervasive surveillance by the NSA). 
3  See Lisa Benton-Short, After 9/11, Public Spaces No Longer Represent Freedom, TIME 
(Sept. 9, 2016), http://time.com/4482672/public-space-after-september-11/ [https://perma.cc/ 
BH5C-SUBF]. See generally Daniel S. Harawa, The Post-TSA Airport: A Constitution Free 
Zone? 41 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2013) (discussing airport security measures). 
4  Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-gr 
ows-in-cities.html [https://perma.cc/B9XL-SZHB]. 
5  See Krishnadev Calamur, 5 Things to Know About the NSA’s Surveillance Activities, NPR, 
(Oct. 23, 2013, 12:14 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/10/23/240239062/ 
five-things-to-know-about-the-nsas-surveillance-activities [https://perma.cc/G6ET-2JNA]. 
6  Laura Shin, Hackers Are Hijacking Phone Numbers and Breaking Into Email, Banks Ac-
counts: How to Protect Yourself, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2016, 11:48 AM), https://www.forbes.co 
m/sites/laurashin/2016/12/21/hackers-are-hijacking-phone-numbers-and-breaking-into-
email-and-bank-accounts-how-to-protect-yourself [https://perma.cc/LQ3P-9Y2C]; Brigid 
Sweeney, The Frightening New Frontier for Hackers: Medical Records, MOD. HEALTHCARE 
(Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170410/NEWS/170419987 
[https://perma.cc/55JW-PLQC]; Craig Timberg, How Equifax Hackers Might Use Your So-
cial Security Number to Pretend They’re You, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.was 
hingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/09/08/how-equifax-hackers-might-use-your-soci 
al-security-number-to-pretend-theyre-you [https://perma.cc/77VM-NRKH]. 
7  Chris Smith, Hackers Can Spy on You Through Amazon Echo, N.Y. POST (Aug. 2, 2017, 
4:57 PM), http://nypost.com/2017/08/02/hackers-can-spy-on-you-through-amazon-echo/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/B63P-HBZH]. See generally Simon Hill, Is Your Smartphone Listening to 
Everything You Say? We Asked the Experts, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 15, 2017, 3:10 AM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/is-your-smartphone-listening-to-your-conversations/ 
[https://perma.cc/9KL7-XPRF]. 
8  See generally Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Business of Artificial Intelli-
gence, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 2017), https://hbr.org/cover-story/2017/07/the-business-of-arti 
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ture developments artificial intelligence will be able to read our minds and 
thoughts.9 
In short, much of the information that we have historically believed to be, 
and sought to keep, private might be seized by both private parties and gov-
ernments and used for multiple purposes without our consent. Along these 
lines, there are four areas of possible privacy violations. One, the government’s 
direct request or demand that one provide private information; two, the gov-
ernment’s request to others, such as Facebook and Google, that they produce 
one’s private information; three, the government’s use of one’s information for 
purposes other than that for which it was voluntarily given; and four, the gov-
ernment’s private surveillance of one’s daily activities.10 
This Article will explore the possibility that the governmental use of data, 
in the four above-stated areas, may infringe upon one’s constitutional right to 
informational privacy. Part I will examine potential privacy violations and 
show how government entities can misuse one’s private information. Part II 
will review substantive due process standards and some of the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and it will conclude that the Amendment is appli-
cable in a civil context and should be the primary source for a constitutional 
right to informational privacy. Part III then examines the United States Su-
preme Court’s precedent on informational privacy and concludes that the Court 
has recognized such a right to privacy, but that it should more clearly state so, 
and establish standards that federal circuit courts of appeals must use when 
evaluating claims asserting a violation of the informational right to privacy. 
Part IV will discuss the federal circuit courts of appeals current interpretation of 
the scope of the constitutional right to information privacy, and shows that, 
without Supreme Court guidance, some of these courts have fashioned conflict-
ing rules and doctrines that establish a disuniformity of protection. Part V will 
explain that broad standards should be used to give the broadest application of 
a claim for a constitutional right to informational privacy. And, Part VI will 
conclude that a constitutional right to informational privacy claim is needed 
and that the Fourth Amendment and strict scrutiny should be used by courts in 
their evaluation of the claim. 
I. POTENTIAL PRIVACY VIOLATIONS 
A. Government’s Requests or Demands for Certain Information 
The state and federal governments demand one’s private information when 
he or she applies for a driver’s license, social security, governmental employ-
                                                                                                                                
ficial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/D3RV-P3YD]. 
9  Luke Dormehl, This A.I. Literally Reads Your Mind to Re-create Images of the Faces You 
See, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 26, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/uni 
versity-of-toronto-mind-reading-ai/ [https://perma.cc/2QTB-5C89]. 
10  See infra notes 11−22 and accompanying text. 
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ment, and many other services.11 Mostly, we do not object to providing such 
information. However, one might resist disclosing some sensitive information, 
such as one’s sexual orientation, HIV or other disease status, prior history of 
drug usage, genetic disposition to certain diseases, and many other types of pri-
vate information. Many of these objections implicate one’s constitutional right 
to informational privacy; and therefore, the government should have to offer a 
sufficiently strong justification before it can compel production of some types 
of private information. 
B. The Government’s Obtaining One’s Personal Data from Facebook, 
Google, and Other Social Media 
Subscribers to such social media platforms as Facebook and Google submit 
a substantial amount of private data to these services.12 But, there is at least one 
federal law that might be leading federal and state governments to violate citi-
zens’ rights to privacy. That law is the Electronic Communication Privacy Act 
of 1986,13 which includes the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and 
Transactional Records Access Act.14 This law allows “a governmental entity” 
to request a copy of stored wire or “electronic communication” from Facebook, 
Google and other social media providers, without any showing of probable 
cause, if the stored information is more than 180 days old, and the request can 
be made through an “administrative subpoena” or “trial subpoena.”15 Even if 
the governmental entity seeks a court order to compel production of the stored 
Facebook content, a court can order a disclosure of the information on a mere 
showing that the information is “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”16 This means that the government does not have to show proba-
ble cause that the Facebook subscriber or user has committed a crime.17 
                                                        
11  See generally Rachel Levinson-Waldman, What the Government Does with Americans’ 
Data, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2013) (discussing government’s collection and use of data, 
including possible misusages of data), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publ 
ications/Data%20Retention%20-%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2AU-7283]. 
12  Facebook & Your Privacy: Who Sees the Data You Share on the Biggest Social Network? 
CONSUMER REP. (June 2012), https://news.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/06/faceb 
ook-your-privacy/index.htm [https://perma.cc/DJN6-XM8E]. 
13  Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012)). 
14  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012). 
15  18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012). 
16  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). 
17  Id. Several laws have been introduced in the U.S. Congress to require that the governmen-
tal entity show probable cause before it can obtain stored digital content, regardless of the 
age of the information, including data that has been in storage for more than 180 days. David 
Ruiz, Email Privacy Act Comes Back, Hopefully to Stay, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 
(May 29, 2018) (discussing various versions of the Email Privacy Act that Representative 
Kevin Yoder (R-KS) and others have introduced over the years), https://www.eff.org/deeplin 
ks/2018/05/email-privacy-act-comes-back-hopefully-stay [https://perma.cc/J8WP-3H7C]. 
See Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015, S. 356, 114th Cong. 
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C. Governmental Employees’ Misuse of Information that Citizens Provide for 
Legitimate Purposes 
Each day American citizens submit private information to obtain the gov-
ernmental benefits mentioned above.18 And, there are state laws mandating that 
some private information, such as sexually transmitted diseases, be submitted 
to public health agencies.19 The problem is that some governmental employees 
have used, and might use, such sensitive information for ulterior purposes, in-
cluding to further their own private needs for romance and retaliation against 
others.20 Obviously, such illegitimate usages of citizens’ private information 
raise substantial issues that implicate one’s constitutional right to informational 
privacy. 
D. Pervasive Governmental Surveillance 
The concern here is that governments—through pervasive and sophisticat-
ed use of ever-present traffic and security cameras, face recognition technolo-
gy, cell phone location tracking systems, bank account records, and other 
means of monitoring each and every aspect of citizens’ lives—can secretly cre-
ate a map of one’s entire existence.21 Certain law enforcement entities have 
                                                                                                                                
(2015) (including a provision that would have obviated the distinction between digital mate-
rial stored for less than and for more than 180 days). 
For an argument that Facebook and other major social media providers do attempt to aggres-
sively protect subscribers’ data from governmental intrusions, see Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Sur-
veillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99 (2018). 
Presently, the federal and state governments request a substantial amount of digital infor-
mation that is contained in Facebook, Google and other social medial networks. As a matter 
of fact, Facebook issues quarterly reports showing minimal information about the large 
number of requests that it receives from different government entities. See Facebook Trans-
parency Report, FACEBOOK, https://www.transparency.facebook.com/ [https://perma.cc/CZ4 
T-SKXV] (last accessed June 29, 2018); see also James Rogers, The US Government is Ask-
ing Facebook for More and More Data on Its Users, FOX NEWS (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www 
.foxnews.com/tech/2017/12/20/us-government-is-asking-facebook-for-more-and-more-data-
on-social-networks-users.html [https://perma.cc/G3YD-PHC3]. 
18  See Facebook & Your Privacy, supra note 12. 
19  See generally PUB. HEALTH LAW RESEARCH, TEMPLE UNIV. & CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVISION OF STD PREVENTION, State Statutes Explicitly Related 
to Sexually Transmitted Diseases in the United States, 2013, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION (2014) https://www.cdc.gov/std/program/final-std-statutesall-states-5june-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HM2-8R9D]. 
20  See Sadie Gurman, AP: Across US, Police Officers Abuse Confidential Databases, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.apnews.com/699236946e3140659fff8a236 
2e16f43 [https://perma.cc/LPN2-45F6]. 
21  Although one might know that traffic cameras are positioned at certain traffic locations, 
he or she might not know that governmental entities can use the information from these 
cameras, along with cell phone location information, bank records information, and medical 
records information, to create a map that discloses a great deal of information about one’s 
movement, purchases, and propensities toward certain behavior, including criminal behavior. 
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used such public and private information to target certain persons who alleged-
ly show a propensity for criminal behavior.22 The crux of the problem is that a 
map of one’s entire existence creates a more substantial invasion of privacy 
than any single invasion that is joined with other invasions to create the map. In 
other words, an isolated traffic camera picture of a person’s running a red light 
may not be as harmful or psychologically oppressive as knowing that the gov-
ernment knows each and every step or computer keystroke the person took for 
three hundred and sixty-five days a year, for the last ten years. Such pervasive 
monitoring, including the eventuality that artificial intelligence might one day 
be able to read our minds, would leave us without any privacy in anything that 
we do. Thus, this Article, in part, takes the position that public monitoring, 
which might normally be permissible, may lead to a violation of one’s constitu-
tional right to informational privacy if such monitoring becomes too perva-
sive.23 
All of the above-stated examples are just some of the privacy concerns that 
are ripe for challenges under the constitutional right to informational privacy 
theory, as discussed in this Article. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS “RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE” UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The central thesis of this Article is that the liberty interest component of 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides support for a constitutional right to infor-
mational privacy, and that right to privacy is consistent with the Court’s sub-
stantive due process precedent. This constitutional right to informational priva-
cy is premised on Justice Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” principle, and it 
primarily stems from the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.24 
The constitutional right to informational privacy is consistent with the 
Court’s substantive due process precedent, as articulated in Washington v. 
Glucksberg,25 Lawrence v. Texas,26 and Obergefell v. Hodges.27 
First, in Glucksberg, the Court restated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
liberty interest protection includes the rights provided for in the Bill of Rights 
                                                                                                                                
See Bill Quigley, Thirteen Ways Government Tracks Us, COMMON DREAMS (Apr. 9, 2012), 
https://www.commondreams.org/views/2012/04/09/thirteen-ways-government-tracks-us. 
22  Justin Jouvenal, Police Are Using Software to Predict Crime. Is it a ‘Holy Grail’ or Bi-
ased Against Minorities, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/loc 
al/public-safety/police-are-using-software-to-predict-crime-is-it-a-holy-grail-or-biased-again 
st-minorities/2016/11/17/525a6649-0472-440a-aae1-b283aa8e5de8_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/2JU3-BTW8]. 
23  See infra text accompanying note 280. 
24  See infra notes 25–85 and accompanying text. 
25  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
26  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
27  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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Amendments.28 Therefore, the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.29 
Second, Glucksberg affirmed a test for determining whether other rights 
are also protected by the liberty interest.30 The Court stated: 
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects 
those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition . . . ” and “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacri-
ficed.” Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a “careful de-
scription” of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.31 
However, Lawrence cautions that courts should not rely strictly on a histor-
ical analysis that is frozen in time, but should also consider changes in practices 
that create a new normal, as “[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but 
not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”32 
Subsequently in Obergefell, the Court, building on Glucksberg and Law-
rence, established that the following factors are important when one seeks con-
stitutional protection of a new liberty interest: (1) how state law and the public 
have historically treated the asserted liberty interest, (2) any change or evolu-
tion in the state law and public treatment of the asserted liberty interest, (3) the 
important principles or policies that support the asserted liberty interests, and 
(4) whether the challenged state’s intrusion on the asserted liberty interest is 
also a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.33 
                                                        
28  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. In other words, the protections provided in the Bill of Rights 
amendments are made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 721. These rights are also deemed to be fundamental and satisfy the “tra-
ditions and ordered liberty” test that Glucksberg affirms as the controlling test for determin-
ing when an asserted right is included within the liberty interest protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 720–21. 
29  Id. at 720; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“Decisions 
prior to the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment ana-
lyzed searches and seizures involving the body under the Due Process Clause and were 
thought to implicate substantial liberty interests.”). 
30  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21. 
31  Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, pursuant to Glucksberg one could say that the substan-
tive due process analysis is mostly a historical analysis to determine which practices have 
been: (1) customarily allowed; and (2) are so important that the United States would not be 
able to operate as the type of society that it has historically been. Id. 
32  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). Therefore, the Court in Lawrence—despite 
a distance history of state’s governments’ proscribing homosexual conduct, including some 
Court precedent allowing such prohibition—reviewed a more tolerant, recent half-century of 
increased acceptance of homosexual behavior, and concluded that the liberty interest of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected homosexual conduct. Id. at 572–79. 
33  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594–2608 (2015). Using this analysis, the Ober-
gefell Court held that state laws against same-sex marriage were unconstitutional violations 
of the petitioners’ Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests. Id. Despite states’ historical out-
lawing of same-sex marriage and homosexual relations, the Court highlighted a changing in 
public and state law attitudes towards such practices, including some states’ laws that, during 
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Therefore, an application of this substantive due process analysis, with a 
blending of Glucksberg, Lawrence, and Obergefell, shows that a constitutional 
right to informational privacy does exist under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
And, that right should be grounded in the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy 
against unreasonable searches and seizures34 because the right to informational 
privacy stems from the same general concerns about unrestrained governmental 
actions. The following cases inform this analysis and support the general theme 
that the government has no right to one’s private information when there is a 
reasonable expectation of continued privacy in that information, unless the 
government offers a legally sufficient justification for its intrusion into such 
private matters.  
A. Entick v. Carrington 
The English case of Entick v. Carrington35 is a landmark case against im-
proper governmental intrusion. In Entick, the owner’s home was searched un-
der a general warrant that was not supported by any evidence that the owner 
had committed a crime or that his home contained evidence that he had written 
the libelous articles against the King and his officers that he was accused of 
writing.36 The appellate court eventually held that the search and seizure were 
unlawful, apparently because they were conducted pursuant to a general war-
rant, without any evidence that the owner had committed the specific crime or 
that his home property contained evidence of the crime.37 
                                                                                                                                
the last half century, have provided more protection for homosexual conduct and same-sex 
marriage. Id. And, the Court outlined four principles or values that marriage served, includ-
ing personal choice and individual autonomy: (1) “because it supports a two-person union 
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals”; (2) “it safeguards children 
and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
education”; (3) it is “a keystone of [our] social order”; and, (4) state laws against same-sex 
marriage treated the same-sex couples differently than opposite-sex couple, thereby violating 
the equal protection clause. Id. at 2589–2604. Therefore, the Obergefell Court held that such 
laws against same-sex marriages violated same-sex couples’ liberty interest under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2604–05. 
34  The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
35  See generally Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.). 
36  Id. at 275–77. During the four-hour search, the law enforcement officers searched all of 
the homeowner’s papers, books, desks, and drawers, including breaking locks on doors and 
otherwise reviewing and reading the owner’s papers. The officers seized and carried away 
many papers and books and the plaintiff himself for an appearance before a magistrate or 
other judicial official. Id. 
37  Id. at 278–92. It seems that the gist of the court’s rationale is that the English tradition 
was that a warrant and a search should be issued and executed only pursuant to credible evi-
dence that a crime had been committed and that the property searched contained specific ev-
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B. Boyd v. United States 
Boyd v. United States38 emphasized the importance of Entick’s influence in 
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.39 And it supports the notion that there 
is a zone of privacy that protects citizens from unjustified governmental intru-
sions into one’s “personal security,” “personal liberty,” and “private proper-
ty.”40 Importantly, Boyd also shows that law enforcement does not have to 
physically invade one’s property to violate the Fourth Amendment.41 Instead, a 
governmental request for a production of documents, that contain private in-
formation, can also violate the Fourth Amendment.42 Therefore, despite recog-
nizing that the forced production of documents was not the same type of intru-
sion as a government official’s entering the petitioner’s property and seizing 
the disputed invoices, the Court held that the forced production of the invoices 
had the same practical effect as a physical intrusion onto the petitioner’s prop-
erty and the seizure of the invoices.43 
                                                                                                                                
idence of the crime. Entick has been very persuasive in England in establishing protection 
for one’s personal privacy and the privacy of one’s home against unrestrained governmental 
intrusion. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (“Entick v. Carrington, 95 
Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765), is a “case we have described as a ‘monument of English free-
dom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American statesman’ at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, and considered to be ‘the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law’ ” with 
regard to search and seizure.”); Madeline A. Herdrich, Note , California v. Greenwood: The 
Trashing of Privacy, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 993, 999 n.31 (1989). 
38  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
39  Id. at 626. The Boyd Court stated: 
It was welcomed and applauded by the lovers of liberty in the colonies as well as in the mother 
country. It is regarded as one of the permanent monuments of the British constitution, and is 
quoted as such by the English authorities on that subject down to the present time. 
Id. 
40  Id. at 630. For example, the Court in Boyd, in a much-cited portion of the opinion, stated: 
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and se-
curity. They reach further than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its ad-
ventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its em-
ployees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his 
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, 
where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,—it is the in-
vasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s judg-
ment. 
Id. 
41  Id. at 621–22. 
42  Id. at 618–19. In Boyd, the petitioner was the owner of thirty-five cases of plate glass, 
which the governmental official seized because the owner had allegedly not paid duties on 
the goods. Id. at 617–18. The owner challenged a notice, that allowed the seizure of the 
good, on the ground that the notice was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 
618. 
43  Id. at 635. The Court further stated: 
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of actual 
search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their substance and essence, and effects their 
substantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive 
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The Court concluded that the statute allowing the notices for production of 
the invoices and the court order pursuant to the statute were void and unconsti-
tutional as a violation of the Fourth Amendment.44 
The implication of Boyd, for the theme of this Article, is that it shows that 
the Fourth Amendment offers protection beyond the traditional situations 
where law enforcement officials physically intrude onto private property to 
search through and seize tangible personal property.45 And, the Court also not-
ed that an erosion of the Amendment’s purpose can “only be obviated by ad-
hering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and 
property should be liberally construed.”46 
Such liberal construction should mean that it is time to explicitly recognize 
that the Fourth Amendment should be the foundational support for a constitu-
tional right to informational privacy, and that the right is applicable to the 
States through the liberty interest clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
C. Weeks v. United States 
Weeks v. United States47 is another case that supports a constitutional right 
to informational privacy.48 In Weeks, the Court reversed the petitioner’s convic-
tion and held that certain papers and books that were obtained from his private 
property, and admitted into evidence, should have been excluded because the 
federal law enforcement officers did not have a warrant to search the proper-
ty.49 The Court made a statement that is relevant to this Article’s argument that 
the Fourth Amendment also protects one from the government’s attempt to co-
erce the production of private information: 
While a search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law, and a seizure 
contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner, still, as was held in the Boyd 
Case, the substance of the offense is the compulsory production of private pa-
                                                                                                                                
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, 
by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be ob-
viated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and proper-
ty should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their effi-
cacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in 
substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and 
against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis. We have no 
doubt that the legislative body is actuated by the same motives; but the vast accumulation of 
public business brought before it sometimes prevents it, on a first presentation, from noticing ob-
jections which become developed by time and the practical application of the objectionable law. 
Id. 
44  Id. at 638. 
45  Id. at 621–22. 
46  Id. at 635. 
47  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
48  Id. at 387. 
49  Id. at 394. 
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pers, whether under a search warrant or a subpoena duces tecum, against which 
the person, be he individual or corporation, is entitled to protection.50 
Weeks also reaffirms that the Fourth Amendment is a fundamental law 
against governmental intrusion.51 And, subsequently, in Mapp v. Ohio,52 the 
Court, for the first time, applied the exclusionary rule to state law enforce-
ment’s violation of the Fourth Amendment,53 holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment establishes a “right of privacy.”54 
D. Olmstead v. United States 
Olmstead v. United States55 is very important to this discussion of the 
Fourth Amendment’s history, and to whether the Amendment can serve as the 
basis for a constitutional right to informational privacy. The majority opinion 
held that no impermissible search and seizure occurred under the Fourth 
Amendment when federal law enforcement officers wiretapped petitioner’s tel-
ephone lines because the officers did not physically invade the petitioner’s 
property.56 The Court reasoned that a violation of the Fourth Amendment does 
not occur without a physical trespass to “the person, the house, his papers, or 
his effects.”57 
Justice Brandeis dissented, and reasoned that no trespass onto private prop-
erty is required for a violation of the Amendment.58 Instead, the Fourth 
Amendment should be interpreted in light of current situations.59 The gist of his 
reasoning is that the Amendment is primarily designed to protect one’s individ-
ual privacy regardless of whether law enforcement trespasses onto, and search-
es, private property. He asserted: 
The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope. The 
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pur-
suit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of 
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure 
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. 
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most 
                                                        
50  Id. at 397 (emphasis added). 
51  Id. at 390. 
52  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
53  Id. at 655. 
54  Id. at 655–56. The Court stated that: “Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has 
been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the 
Federal Government.” Id. at 655 (emphasis added). 
55  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
56  Id. at 466. 
57  Id. at 464. Such is tantamount to requiring that law enforcement officers commit a tres-
pass onto the petitioner’s property, before a violation of the Fourth Amendment can occur. 
58  Id. at 479. 
59  Id. 
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comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect, 
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of 
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts 
ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.60 
His statement that the Fourth Amendment protects one’s “right to be let 
alone” is a central focus of this Article, and the statement envisions that the 
Amendment protects one’s right to privacy against governmental intrusion, by 
“whatever the means,” unless the government has a legally permissible justifi-
cation for the intrusion.61 
E. Katz v. United States 
Subsequently, in Katz v. United States,62 the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment protected a defendant when law enforcement intercepted and rec-
orded his telephone conversations in a public phone booth; this holding over-
ruled the majority opinion in Olmstead.63 Rejecting the idea that a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment required a physical intrusion into a private place, the 
Court stated: “[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures it be-
comes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or 
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”64 Instead of requiring 
a physical invasion into a private place, Katz established that the Amendment 
protects one when he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or 
her private possessions or conversations, whether the possessions or conversa-
tions are in a private or public place.65 Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
test is the predominant test for determining whether one’s Fourth Amendment 
rights have been violated when law enforcement conducts a search or seizure of 
one’s property without a search warrant.66 And, as Part IV will show, that same 
reasonable expectation of privacy test is the test that substantially all of the fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals use to determine whether a constitutional right to 
informational privacy attaches to an asserted liberty interest. This use is another 
                                                        
60  Id. at 478–79 (emphasis added). 
61  It should be noted that the majority opinion in Olmstead—that the Fourth Amendment did 
not protect one from law enforcement’s wiretapping of his or her telephone lines when no 
physical trespass has occurred on one’s property—has been overruled by Katz v United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which established a new standard for interpreting whether a vio-
lation of the amendment has occurred. 
62  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
63  Id. at 359. 
64  Id. at 353 (alteration in original). 
65  Id. 
66  See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (discussing Katz and the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test and the trespass test); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 
746 (2010) (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
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reason why the Court should give serious consideration to using the Fourth 
Amendment as the source for a constitutional right to informational privacy. 
But, there is some confusion in Katz as to whether the Fourth Amendment 
provides for a “general right to privacy.”67 Justice Stewart’s majority opinion 
states: 
Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitu-
tional “right to privacy.” That Amendment protects individual privacy against 
certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often 
have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution pro-
tect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protec-
tion of a person's general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other peo-
ple—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the 
law of the individual States.68 
However, despite Justice Stewart’s statements against a general right to 
privacy, it is clear from the Court’s opinion that the petitioner in Katz was not 
asserting a general right to privacy.69 Rather, he was asserting that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits the warrantless interception and recording of his private 
telephone conversation, which is a specific assertion of a Fourth Amendment 
right to privacy to protect his telephone conversation.70 Therefore, at best, Jus-
tice Stewart’s anti-general right to privacy statement is dicta. 
In summary, it is reasonably clear that the analysis of the above-discussed 
cases, from Entick to Katz, shows a continual evolution of the Fourth Amend-
ment. And, the central feature of that evolution is that one should be protected 
against unrestrained governmental intrusion into his private affairs. The found-
ing fathers acknowledged the need for such protection when they were faced 
with the governmental use of general warrants and writs of assistance during 
colonial times.71 They heralded the Entick opinion, a 1765 English trespass 
case, and its holding that a search, that did not specifically identify the alleged 
evidence of a crime and that did not allege that the property owner had commit-
ted a specific crime, was an impermissible trespass;72 and, because of Entick’s 
check on unjustified governmental intrusion, the founding fathers, in part, re-
lied on it to support the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, as protection 
                                                        
67  Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–51. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at 350. (One of the questions that the petitioner presented was: “Whether physical 
penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can 
be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
70  Id. at 349–50. 
71  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–30 (1886); see also Carpenter v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (“The Founding generation crafted the Fourth Amendment as a 
“response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, 
which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evi-
dence of criminal activity.”) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
72  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627. 
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against governmental searches and seizures that are not premised on probable 
cause that one has committed a specific crime.73 
And, Boyd, more than one hundred years ago, established that the Fourth 
Amendment protection covers the government’s request for private infor-
mation, by way of a demand for the information or subpoena, even when there 
is no physical invasion of one’s home or other property.74 Subsequently, Weeks 
reaffirmed Boyd that such unjustified governmental demand for information 
can violate the Fourth Amendment.75 And, Olmstead’s dissenting opinion by 
Justice Brandeis, which is the only relevant part of the opinion given that Katz 
overruled the majority opinion,76 emphasizes that the Fourth Amendment’s 
main purpose is to protect one’s “right to be let alone”77 and that “every unjus-
tifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, what-
ever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.”78 Next, Mapp acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment creates a 
“right of privacy” against governmental intrusions into the spaces protected by 
the Amendment.79 And Katz defines those protected spaces as any space in 
which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy, given that the Amendment 
“protects people—and not simply ‘areas.’ ”80 
The next extension of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is for the 
Court to affirm that the Fourth Amendment grants one a constitutional right to 
informational privacy against any unjustified governmental intrusion, and that 
the right is enforceable against state governments and their employees. The 
Fourth Amendment is the proper source for a constitutional right to informa-
tional privacy because it takes no great stretch of the imagination to recognize 
that all searches and seizures, regarding criminal activity, seek information in 
some form and manner. That information might be a statement that evidence 
was found on someone’s property, or that the information was garnered from 
reading the content of someone’s papers, records, books, or diaries. And, by 
way of comparison, governmental requests and demands for private infor-
mation, in a noncriminal context, seek information in some form and manner. 
Therefore, because there is nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment 
that makes it inapplicable to civil matters and proceedings,81 the Amendment 
and its “right of privacy” protection should apply any time the government 
seeks private information—whether in a civil context, or a criminal context—
and should prevent the intrusion unless there is sufficient legal justification for 
                                                        
73  Id. at 627–628. 
74  Id. at 638. 
75  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397 (1914). 
76  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
77  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928). 
78  Id. 
79  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961). 
80  Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
81  See supra text accompanying note 34. 
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the invasion of one’s privacy. The Court’s adoption of this rationale would of-
fer more support for a constitutional right to informational privacy. As a matter 
of fact, one could legitimately argue that Whalen v. Roe82 and Nixon v. Admin-
istrator of General Services,83 in citing Fourth Amendment cases84 and in dis-
cussing the reasonable expectation of privacy standard,85 have already started 
the journey towards a doctrine that the Fourth Amendment is the most logical 
source for the establishment and development of a constitutional right to infor-
mational privacy. 
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
The Court’s decision in Whalen v. Roe is one of its strongest opinions to 
recognize a constitutional right to informational privacy. In Whalen, certain 
physicians and patients challenged a New York statute that mandated the col-
lection and storage of copies of physicians’ prescriptions for schedule II 
drugs.86 The patients were mostly concerned that the law required that their 
physicians file, with a designated state agency, a copy of each prescription, 
which contained the patients’ names and addresses.87 They alleged that such 
filings would have both a chilling effect on patients’ willingness to seek medi-
cal treatment, and that such disclosure of private information might damage 
their reputations.88 
The patients challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated their right 
to privacy.89 The Court held that any such right to privacy would stem from the 
“liberty interest” prong of the Fourteenth Amendment.90 Then, the Court ap-
peared to hold that the patients did have a “liberty interest” right to the confi-
dentiality of their medical information.91 For example, in a much-cited portion 
of its opinion, the Court stated that “the cases sometimes characterized as pro-
tecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. 
One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and 
                                                        
82  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
83  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
84  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.25; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 461–62 (distinguishing President Nix-
on’s case from the Fourth Amendment issues in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965), but 
applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test to his case). 
85  Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465 (“[A]ppellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his per-
sonal communications.”). 
86  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591–95. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 600. 
89  Id. at 599–600. 
90  Id. at 598 n.23; Id. at 606 (“We simply hold that this record does not establish an invasion 
of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
91  Id. at 599–600. 
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another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important de-
cisions.”92 
However, the Court held that the New York statute did not violate the pa-
tients’ liberty interest because the state’s interest in obtaining the medical in-
formation outweighed the patients’ privacy.93 
At bottom, Whalen’s importance is that it appears to recognize that the per-
sonal liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a constitutional 
right to informational privacy, which the Court labeled as the “avoiding disclo-
sure of personal matters” interest.94 As support for “the avoiding disclosure of 
                                                        
92  Id. 
93  Id. at 598–604. 
94  Id. at 599. For other discussion of the constitutional right to information privacy prong of 
Whalen, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS 
L. J. 643 (2007) (arguing that the Court should find that there is a constitutional right to in-
formational privacy under the liberty clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, Pro-
fessor Chemerinsky narrowly interprets Whalen’s majority opinion and broadly interprets 
Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion, which attempts to limit the scope of the majority opin-
ion). See also Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. L. REV. 159, 205–22 
(2015) (discussing the Fourth Amendment and different theories of informational privacy, 
but asserting that a constitutional right to informational privacy should be limited to claims 
involving “intimate information” and “political thought,” and that strict scrutiny should be 
used for such claims); Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: 
The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 479, 492–95 (1990) (discussing the possibility of using the Fourth Amendment as a 
source for a constitutional right to informational privacy, but asserting that it would not cov-
er many invasions of privacy and, therefore, advocates for a privacy right that is “independ-
ent of the fourth amendment”). 
The positions taken in this Article disagree with the main positions taken in the above-cited 
articles. First, as shown throughout this Article, contrary to the position that Professor 
Chemerinsky takes in his article, Whalen is strong enough to conclusively establish that there 
is a constitutional right to informational privacy. Second, this Article strongly rebuts Justice 
Stewart concurring opinion in Whalen and his majority opinion in Katz by arguing that the 
protection of one’s right “to be let alone,” and therefore constitutional right to informational 
privacy, should not be left to state law protection under state torts theories, but such informa-
tional privacy right, being based on the Fourth Amendment, as this Article argues, should be 
grounded in the U.S. Constitution and therefore enforceable as a matter of constitutional law 
litigation and not just state law torts litigation. Lastly, regarding Professor Skinner-
Thompson’s article, a constitutional right to informational privacy should not be confined to 
“intimate information” and to “political thought” claims. This is shown by the fact that most 
of the federal circuit courts of appeals opinions, that this Article discusses, do not limit the 
constitutional right to informational privacy theory to such limited issues. Instead, these cir-
cuit courts used the reasonable expectation of privacy concept as the decisive factor in de-
termining whether one’s claim is within the scope of the constitutional right to informational 
privacy theory. See infra text accompanying notes 184–209. However, this Article does ar-
gue that strict scrutiny should be used to evaluate whether a state action has impermissibly 
intruded on one’s constitutional right to informational privacy. But, instead of supporting the 
use of strict scrutiny because it is used for “intimate information” and “political thought” 
issues when other constitutional law claims and theories are being litigated, this Article sup-
ports the use of strict scrutiny because it provides the most protection and because it would 
require state actors to really evaluate proposed state laws and other state actions before en-
acting the laws or before performing other actions so that they can be certain that they have 
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personal matters” privacy interest, the Court cited certain precedent basically 
establishing that the constitutional right to information privacy is rooted in Jus-
tice Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” privacy principle.95 In footnote 25 of the 
opinion, the Court cited Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in Olmstead,96 
which described “ ‘the right to be let alone’ as the right most valued by civilized 
men.”97 In that same opinion, Justice Brandeis furthered stated: “To protect, 
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of 
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.”98 
The “whatever the means employed” criterion would include governmental 
requests for the production of private information in which one has a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy. The criterion would apply regardless of whether that 
request is made in a subpoena duces tecum, in a job application, or to a third 
party who has possession of one’s private information, such as a request to 
one’s physician to produce medical records, or to some other third party to pro-
duce other information in which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the information. 
In addition to relying on Justice Brandeis’s dissent, the Whalen Court, in 
footnote 25, also cited Griswold v. Connecticut99 for the proposition that, “the 
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmen-
tal intrusion.”100 The logical implication from Griswold is that one has a consti-
tutional right to be free from unjustified governmental intrusion into the zone of 
privacy created by the language of certain amendments of the Bill of Rights. 
And, that such privacy protection extends to related matters that are necessary 
for the protection of the rights specifically referenced in the amendments. That 
                                                                                                                                
seriously considered alternative laws and actions that would be less intrusive into one’s con-
stitutional right to informational privacy. 
In an unrelated matter, a few words are in order regarding the “independence in making cer-
tain kinds of important decision interest” prong of Whalen, that, as the quote to which this 
footnote is attached, establishes is a different area of privacy than the constitutional right to 
informational privacy prong that is discussed in the paragraph immediately above. The “in-
dependence in making certain kinds of important decision interest” has historically involved 
abortion, contraception, and other intimate decisions that people make. In Whalen, the Court 
cited Roe v. Wade, and several other cases, and summed the cases up as follows: “In Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), the Court characterized these decisions as dealing with 
‘matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rear-
ing and education. In these areas, it has been held that there are limitations on the States’ 
power to substantively regulate conduct.’ ” Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.26 (citation omitted). 
In conclusion, one should not try to limit a constitutional right to informational privacy to 
areas involving intimate matters or information, which is a separate area of privacy. 
95  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.25. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added). 
99  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
100  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.25 (alteration in original). 
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privacy protection, wherever it exists, is tantamount to a right “to be let alone” 
from unwanted governmental intrusion, which arguably is the reason why the 
Whalen Court cited Griswold as support for the “avoiding disclosure of person-
al matters” interest, mostly labeled as a constitutional right to informational 
privacy.101 
As further support for the “right to be let alone” principle, the Whalen 
Court cited Stanley v. Georgia.102 In Stanley, the Court held that a Georgia stat-
ute that outlawed the possession of obscene materials was a violation of the 
First Amendment.103 The Court relied on Justice Brandeis’s “right to be let 
alone” principle,104 and opined that the First Amendment protects one’s right to 
receive information and the right to possess and read materials in his or her 
home, even if that information is obscene material.105 The Court stated: 
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business 
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what 
films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of 
giving government the power to control men’s minds.106 
This conclusion is mostly a holding that one has “a right to be let alone” in 
the privacy of his or her own home regarding the types of books and films he or 
she reads and views. And, “the right to be let alone” is the reason why the 
Court cited Stanley in support of its analysis that the liberty interest includes 
the “avoiding disclosure of personal matters” interest, which again is the same 
as a constitutional right to informational privacy.107 If the Whalen Court did not 
mean for Stanley to support a constitutional right to informational privacy, 
there would have been no reason for the Court to cite Stanley, given that 
Whalen did not involve a First Amendment claim, which is the primary claim 
that the parties litigated in Stanley, and therefore, is the primary focus of Stan-
ley’s holding. 
Subsequent to Whalen, the Court’s decision in Nixon v. Administrator of 
General Services108 further establishes that there is a constitutional right to in-
formation privacy. Citing Whalen, the Nixon Court stated: “One element of pri-
vacy has been characterized as ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.’ ”109 And, the Court held that President Nixon did not auto-
matically give up his privacy interest in his personal materials that were inter-
mingled with public documents and tapes: “We may agree with appellant that, 
at least when Government intervention is at stake, public officials, including 
                                                        
101  Id. at 599. 
102  Id. 
103  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). 
104  Id. at 565. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599. 
108  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
109  Id. at 457. 
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the President, are not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights 
in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public ca-
pacity.”110 This quote clearly shows that the Nixon Court believed that there is a 
constitutional right to protect private information, whether that right is called a 
constitutional right to informational privacy or a constitutional right of “avoid-
ing disclosure of personal matters.”111 
Despite Nixon’s clarity, there is dictum in the opinion that courts can rely 
on, and that some have relied on, to question whether the opinion supports a 
constitutional right to protect private information. For example, the Court stat-
ed: “We may assume with the District Court, for the purposes of this case, that 
this pattern of de facto Presidential control and congressional acquiescence 
gives rise to appellant’s legitimate expectation of privacy in such materials.”112 
Some might use this quote to assert that the Court merely assumed—without 
deciding—that the President had a constitutionally protected right to privacy in 
his private information. After all, the Court used the phrase “We may assume.” 
But, there are several reasons why these words should not be taken out of con-
text. First, this phrase comes later in the opinion, after the Court has already 
unambiguously relied on Whalen to state: “One element of privacy has been 
characterized as ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters.’ ”113 Therefore, the, “We may assume” language—when put in proper con-
                                                        
110  Id. 
111  Id. The Court stated: 
In sum, appellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications. But 
the constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of the limited intrusion of the 
screening process, of appellant’s status as a public figure, of his lack of any expectation of pri-
vacy in the overwhelming majority of the materials, of the important public interest in preserva-
tion of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of segregating the small quantity of private 
materials without comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act’s sensitivity to 
appellant’s legitimate privacy interests, see § 104(a)(7), the unblemished record of the archivists 
for discretion, and the likelihood that the regulations to be promulgated by the Administrator 
will further moot appellant’s fears that his materials will be reviewed by ‘a host of persons,’ we 
are compelled to agree with the District Court that appellant’s privacy claim is without merit. 
Id. at 464–65 (citations omitted). 
112  Id. at 457–58. 
113  Id. at 457. More expansively, the Court stated: 
One element of privacy has been characterized as “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure 
of personal matters . . . .” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). We may agree with appel-
lant that, at least when Government intervention is at stake, public officials, including the Presi-
dent, are not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life 
unrelated to any acts done by them in their public capacity. Presidents who have established 
Presidential libraries have usually withheld matters concerned with family or personal finances, 
or have deposited such materials with restrictions on their screening. We may assume with the 
District Court, for the purposes of this case, that this pattern of de facto Presidential control and 
congressional acquiescence gives rise to appellant’s legitimate expectation of privacy in such 
materials. This expectation is independent of the question of ownership of the materials, an issue 
we do not reach. But the merit of appellant’s claim of invasion of his privacy cannot be consid-
ered in the abstract; rather, the claim must be considered in light of the specific provisions of the 
Act, and any intrusion must be weighed against the public interest in subjecting the Presidential 
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text—is best understood as being a part of the Nixon Court’s analysis of wheth-
er some of the challenged documents at issue were private enough to be pro-
tected by the constitutional right to informational privacy, as opposed to being 
too public to warrant constitutional protection.114 The de facto practice that the 
Court referenced is the one in which former presidents, at the end of their pres-
idencies, “have usually withheld matters concerned with family or personal fi-
nances” from the public documents that are stored in presidential libraries and 
are deemed public documents.115 The gist of the Court’s analysis is that, if the 
documents are of the type that former presidents have withheld because they 
involve only private matters, then Nixon would have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy that he could withhold similar documents116—with that legitimate ex-
pectation being based on the former (or de facto) practice that presidents have 
used to withhold such private information.117 
However, whether Nixon—or some other president—believed that a de 
facto policy allowed him to keep possession of certain private documents is a 
different issue than whether these private documents are protected by a consti-
tutional right to informational privacy. In other words, whether there is a gen-
eral constitutional right to informational privacy is governed by the Court’s de-
cision in Whalen, the legal precedents that the Whalen Court cites in footnote 
25, and—as this Article argues—the Fourth Amendment; it is not governed on-
                                                                                                                                
materials of appellant’s administration to archival screening. Under this test, the privacy interest 
asserted by appellant is weaker than that found wanting in the recent decision of Whalen v. Roe, 
supra. Emphasizing the precautions utilized by New York State to prevent the unwarranted dis-
closure of private medical information retained in a state computer bank system, Whalen reject-
ed a constitutional objection to New York’s program on privacy grounds. Not only does the Act 
challenged here mandate regulations similarly aimed at preventing undue dissemination of pri-
vate materials but, unlike Whalen, the Government will not even retain long-term control over 
such private information; rather, purely private papers and recordings will be returned to appel-
lant under § 104(a)(7) of the Act. 
Id. at 457–59 (internal citations omitted). 
114  Id. at 457. If the documents were public, the relevant federal law would mostly make 
them the property of the federal government, and therefore not subject to President Nixon’s 
possession and control after he left the White House. Id. at 454. 
115  Id. at 457. 
116  Id. at 459–60. 
117  In other words, the Nixon Court first recognized a constitutional right to informational 
privacy, and then assumed that President Nixon’s private papers and other correspondence 
would be private enough to fall within the constitutional right to informational privacy. See 
supra note 114 and accompanying text. The Court proceeded to analyze whether the gov-
ernment’s limited review of the private papers and correspondence was constitutionally per-
missible in light of the asserted governmental interest that the limited review of the private 
papers was necessary to further the purpose of the federal statutory law that established that 
the President’s public papers, as opposed to the private papers, was governmental/public 
property that the President had to relinquish to the government, instead of taking them with 
him as private property when he left the White House. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 456–65. Unfortu-
nately, both the Court—in a subsequent opinion—and lower-level federal courts, have seized 
upon the “assumption” language to walk back from or minimize the Court’s holding in Nix-
on. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147–48 (2011); Nunes v. 
Mass. Dep’t. of Corr., 766 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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ly by some de facto practice of former presidents believing they can keep cer-
tain documents as private records. Therefore, when read in context, Nixon is 
strong support that the Court affirmed the existence of a constitutionally pro-
tected right to informational privacy. 
The next relevant case in the Court’s jurisprudence is Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston.118 Although this case is mostly one that interprets the Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure requirement—instead of being a strict analysis 
of a constitutional right to informational privacy under the Fourteenth or Fifth 
Amendment—the Court does make reference to Whalen and its impact on a 
right to privacy. In Ferguson, the Court considered a local law enforcement 
policy whereby pregnant patients’ physicians would conduct urine tests of the 
patients and then report the results of those tests to law enforcement if they 
showed cocaine use.119 The alleged purpose of the policy was to give the pa-
tients—whose tests revealed the use of cocaine—an incentive to participate in 
substance abuse treatment, or otherwise face criminal prosecution.120 Physi-
cians voluntarily complied with the policy without obtaining their patients’ 
consent.121 In resolving a legal challenge by some of the patients, the Court 
held that the nonconsensual urine tests were an impermissible search in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.122 The Court reached this conclusion primarily 
because of the substantial entanglement of the physicians with law enforcement 
officials who drafted, monitored and enforced the urine test policy, including 
initiating the prosecution of several pregnant women.123 
Regarding a general constitutional right to privacy, the Court stated, “The 
reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing di-
agnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared 
with nonmedical personnel without her consent. In none of our prior cases was 
there any intrusion upon that kind of expectation.”124 In so stating, the Court 
relied on Whalen and asserted, “we have previously recognized that an intru-
sion on that expectation may have adverse consequences because it may deter 
patients from receiving needed medical care.”125 In citing Whalen, the Fergu-
son Court, by reasonable inference, recognized Whalen as precedent indicating 
that one can have a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in, at least, 
one’s medical treatment and medical records.126 
Therefore, given the Court’s analysis in Whalen and Nixon, and its refer-
ence to Whalen in the Ferguson opinion, one can logically conclude that the 
                                                        
118  Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
119  Id. at 70–73. 
120  Id. at 72. 
121  Id. at 77–78. 
122  Id. at 81–86. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. at 78 (citations omitted). 
125  Id. at 78 n.14 (citation omitted). 
126  Id. 
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Court has conclusively held that the liberty interest protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and of the Fifth Amendment, by reasonable inference) includes a 
constitutional right to informational privacy. 
However, the Court’s decision in National Aeronautics & Space Admin-
istration v. Nelson127 called into question the precedential effect of both Whalen 
and Nixon.128 In Nelson, certain contract employees of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) challenged a new policy that required 
NASA’s contract employees to undergo the same background checks as re-
quired for NASA’s civil service employees.129 The contract employees alleged 
that the general questionnaire, and a specific questionnaire for certain refer-
ences, violated their constitutional “right to informational privacy.”130 Despite 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that the general forms’ questions 
(about former drug treatment) and the specific questionnaire’s broad reference 
questions (about the person’s character for “honesty and trustworthiness”) 
“likely violate[d] respondents’ informational-privacy rights,”131 the Nelson 
Court held that both the general questionnaire and the specific reference ques-
tionnaire did not violate the Constitution.132 
Instead of reaffirming the existence of a constitutional right to information-
al privacy, the Court gave a narrow interpretation to Whalen and Nixon by stat-
ing that it had only assumed, for the purpose of the facts at issue in those cases, 
that there was a constitutional right to privacy.133 The Court stated: 
 As was our approach in Whalen, we will assume for present purposes that 
the Government’s challenged inquiries implicate a privacy interest of constitu-
tional significance. We hold, however, that, whatever the scope of this interest, it 
does not prevent the Government from asking reasonable questions of the sort 
included on SF–85 and Form 42 in an employment background investigation 
that is subject to the Privacy Act’s safeguards against public disclosure.134 
This quote adds confusion as to whether Whalen and Nixon did or did not 
establish that there is a constitutional right to informational privacy. Such con-
fusion was not necessary, given the mere fact that the Whalen Court cited legal 
authority in footnote 25 to support the existence of “a right to be let alone” in 
certain areas of privacy.135 
                                                        
127  Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011). 
128  Id. at 147–48 n.10. 
129  Id. at 138–39. 
130  Id. at 144. 
131  Id. at 142–43. 
132  Id. at 159. 
133  Id. at 147–48. 
134  Id. (citations omitted). 
135  Again, in light of the Court’s analysis in Whalen, and its citation of authority in footnote 
25, the only open issue should be whether a specific privacy claim is within the scope of a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest under the liberty prong of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and under the Fourth Amendment (as argued in this Article), and not whether there is a 
constitutionally protected right of informational privacy. Id. at n.10. 
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But, having assumed a constitutional right to privacy, the Nelson Court 
proceeded with a balancing analysis that pitted the contract employees’ right of 
privacy against the governmental intrusion through the use of the background 
questionnaires. The Court held that the governmental interest that the question-
naires promoted outweighed the contract employees’ privacy interest in not 
disclosing the requested private information.136 
An important part of the Nelson decision, as it relates to the theme of this 
Article, is the disagreement between the majority and the concurring opinions. 
Justice Alito, the drafter of the opinion, was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor.137 They jointly sup-
ported the Court’s decision to assume, only for the purpose of the facts before 
it, that the Constitution provides for a right to informational privacy—asserting 
that this was the approach that the Court took in Whalen.138 In footnote 10, the 
Court opined that the “petitioners did not ask us to hold that there is no consti-
tutional right to informational privacy, and respondents and their amici thus 
understandably refrained from addressing that issue in detail.”139 The Court al-
so believed that it should proceed with caution because such a definitive deci-
sion, that the Constitution does provide for a right to informational privacy, 
would require a substantive due process analysis.140 
In a scathing concurrence, Justice Scalia asserted that the Court should not 
have assumed that there was a constitutional right to informational privacy, and 
that it should have specifically held that there is no such right because the Con-
stitution does not provide for a right to informational privacy.141 And, he rea-
soned that the Court’s process of assuming a constitutional right, and subse-
quently resolving the case by applying the right to the facts, would only lead to 
confusion in the circuit courts of appeals.142 First, Justice Scalia believed that 
the Court should not use substantive due process as the Constitution only pro-
vides for procedural due process.143 He then asserted that even if it were appro-
                                                        
136  Id. at 151–53. 
137  Id. at 137. 
138  Id. at 147–48. 
139  Id. at 147 n.10. 
140  Id. To support its decision not to wade into the substantive due process waters, the Court 
cited several decisions, including Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 
(1990), which assumed, for the purpose of that case, “that the United States Constitution 
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydra-
tion and nutrition.” Id. 
141  Id. at 159–60 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
142  Justice Scalia’s prediction about confusion is correct. See infra notes 182–267 and ac-
companying text. However, most federal circuit courts of appeals have ignored Nelson’s 
contention that Whalen does not establish that there is a constitutional right to informational 
privacy; and therefore, almost all of the federal circuit courts have accepted that there is a 
constitutional right to informational privacy and have used Whalen to develop their own tests 
and standards for analyzing that constitutional right. See infra notes 182–269 and accompa-
nying text. 
143  Nelson, 562 U.S. at 161. 
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priate to use substantive due process under the Court’s precedent, the majority 
opinion strayed away from the formula that the Court has used to resolve such 
issues.144 He also believed that the Court, in assuming that a constitutional right 
to privacy existed for the purpose of the case before it, created more confusion 
by not establishing a standard specific enough that courts can use to resolve 
claims asserting a right to informational privacy.145 
But, both the majority and concurring opinions are open to critique. First, 
despite the majority opinion’s interpreting Whalen and Nixon as only assuming 
that there is a constitutional right to informational privacy, a clear reading of 
Whalen and Nixon shows that these decisions are based on more than a mere 
assumption; the Whalen and Nixon decisions should be considered a definitive 
statement by the Court that a constitutional right to informational privacy does 
exist. At no place, in either Whalen or Nixon, does the Court state that its appli-
cation and analysis of the privacy issue is based on an assumption that there is a 
constitutional right to informational privacy. Rather, in analyzing the facts un-
der a constitutional right to informational privacy theory, and given that the pe-
titioning parties proceeded under such a theory—regardless of whether such 
was specifically presented as a technical question presented—the Court’s deci-
sions in Whalen and Nixon established the Court’s acceptance that the Constitu-
tion does provide for a constitutional right to informational privacy. 
A. The Nelson Court’s Misinterpretation of Whalen’s Judicial History 
Whether Whalen represents a definitive decision by the Court that there ex-
ists a constitutional right to informational privacy is important because trial and 
appellate courts must resolve current and future claims that raise such issues, 
and without clarity this task becomes far more difficult. And, to the extent that 
the Supreme Court exercises supervisory control over both state and federal 
courts regarding the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, one would think 
that it would be important for the Court to give clear statements about the scope 
of its opinions interpreting the Constitution. 
Further, there is a need for national uniformity in interpreting the Constitu-
tion.146 Despite that there are thirteen federal judicial circuit courts of appeals, 
it is not desirable for each of these circuits to have a different interpretation of 
the same United States Constitution, unless such is absolutely necessary.147 
                                                        
144  Id. 
145  Id. at 167. 
146  Peguero v. United States, 529 U.S. 23, 23 (1999) (“Certiorari was granted to resolve con-
flict in circuits.”). 
147  There might be a need for a disuniformity in lower-level courts’ interpretation of the 
Constitution if the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on an issue subject to multi-
ple interpretations, or if it has spoken on the issue but its decision (or interpretation) is not 
broad enough to encompass a current issue pending before the lower courts. Furthermore, 
the mere fact that the United States Supreme Court has certiorari authority to accept an ap-
peal from a federal court of appeals on the grounds that there is a split amongst the federal 
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And, it is not absolutely necessary to have a different interpretation about the 
existence of a constitutional right to informational privacy because Whalen is a 
clear enough opinion that there is a constitutional right to informational priva-
cy. As a matter of fact, even with the confusion that Nelson caused with its at-
tempt to weaken Whalen’s precedential value, substantially all of the thirteen 
circuit courts of appeals have rejected Nelson’s interpretation that Whalen es-
tablishes only an assumption of a constitutional right to informational priva-
cy.148 Instead of following Nelson, substantially all of the federal circuit courts 
of appeals presently cite Whalen as definitively establishing a constitutional 
right to informational privacy.149 
A closer look at Whalen shows that the federal circuit courts’ interpreta-
tions are correct. First, the appellees in Whalen clearly placed the constitutional 
right to informational privacy issue before the court.150 A single District Court 
judge initially held that the appellees’ claim did not present a substantial consti-
tutional claim.151 However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
                                                                                                                                
circuits is a persuasive statement that a uniform interpretation of laws is desirable to avoid 
conflicts in the application of such laws. Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that 
the Court has discretionary authority to accept an appeal when: “[A] United States court of 
appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of 
appeals on the same important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way 
that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort[.]” SUP. CT. R. 10(a). Therefore, 
there appears to be a federal policy in favor of a uniform interpretation of laws amongst the 
federal courts. 
At least one commentator has acknowledged the desirability of a uniform interpretation of 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution. See generally J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent 
of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 
913, 923 (1983) (“Ideally the federal Constitution and the federal laws should be applied 
consistently and uniformly by all the lower courts, state and federal, throughout the nation. 
There is, in reality, but one due process clause, and theoretically the question of what ‘pro-
cess’ is constitutionally ‘due’ should not vary in cases presenting the same facts, either with-
in one circuit or between two or more circuits.”). 
And some federal courts have recognized that there is some pressure for them to follow the 
reasonable rulings of other circuit courts—to avoid conflicts between the circuits that might 
overburden the United States Supreme Court’s responsibility of resolving conflicts amongst 
the circuits. Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1327 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (“The Court does not have an ‘abiding conviction’ in the ‘reasonableness’ of the 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ judgments, all of which base their holdings on an 
interpretation of Croson previously rejected by this Court.”); id. at 1326 (citing Int’l Soc. for 
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 580 (2d Cir. 1991)), aff’d in part, 505 U.S. 672 
(1992) (“refusing to differ from a considerable weight of contrary and reasonable authority 
‘lest the Supreme Court’s ability to resolve conflicts among the circuits be impaired by the 
sheer number of conflicts’ ”); see also Brock v. Ely Grp., Inc., 788 F.2d 1200, 1204 (6th Cir. 
1986) (“Although we are reluctant to create an intercircuit conflict, we cannot agree with the 
Second Circuit’s ‘judicially created exception.’ ”). 
148  See infra notes 182–269 and accompanying text. 
149  See infra notes 182–269 and accompanying text. 
150  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977). 
151  This is how the Second Circuit Court of Appeals described the claim:  
Alleging that the compelled disclosure to the Department of Health of the identity of patients for 
whom Schedule II drugs have been prescribed unconstitutionally invades the patient’s right to 
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appellees’ claim for the existence of a constitutional right to privacy was a sub-
stantial issue.152 The court held the right to informational privacy existed in part 
because the zone of privacy had been extended beyond the right to use contra-
ception, to the right to have an abortion, and to the right to make decisions 
about an abortion without having to obtain a hospital committee’s approval.153 
As such, the Second Circuit reasoned that the concept of privacy was an evolv-
ing concept, the confines of which would be defined by the current and future 
litigation.154 Thus, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, 
reinstated the lawsuit, and assigned it to a three-judge district court for resolu-
tion of the constitutional right to privacy issue.155 
The three-judge district court held that the prescription reporting require-
ment violated the appellees’ constitutional right to privacy, in part because it 
required the reporting of the names and addresses of patients for whom con-
trolled substances prescriptions were written.156 And, on appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, the Court acknowledged that it was being presented with 
a constitutional right to privacy issue, stating: “The District Court enjoined en-
forcement of the portions of the New York State Controlled Substances Act of 
1972 which require such recording on the ground that they violate appellees’ 
constitutionally protected rights of privacy. We noted probable jurisdiction of 
the appeal . . . and now reverse.”157 
                                                                                                                                
privacy, infringes on the doctor’s right to prescribe treatment solely on the basis of medical con-
siderations, and discriminates against persons suffering from certain diseases by requiring their 
identification to a governmental agency as a condition to receiving medical treatment, plaintiffs 
sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief and asked that a three-judge court be con-
vened, 28 U.S.C. § 2281, to consider their complaint. 
Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1973). The Second Circuit described the district 
court’s determination as “he found no substantial constitutional question and dismissed the 
complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 105. 
152  Id. at 106–08. 
153  Id. 
154  The Second Circuit stated:  
The patients’ main attack is that the requirement of filing with the Department of Health is an 
impermissible invasion of a constitutional right to privacy with respect to the status of their 
health and the medical treatment they are receiving, and the physicians contend that the danger 
of disclosure impairs a constitutional right to make their decisions solely on the basis of medical 
considerations. The concept that privacy may be a constitutional right enjoying protection 
against governmental intrusions other than those banned by specific provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, notably the First and Fourth Amendments, was first explicitly stated in Griswold v. Con-
necticut. 
Id. at 106–07 (citations omitted). 
155  Id. at 109. Contrary to today, a three-judge district court used to be required for resolu-
tion of constitutional law issues. If a constitutional right to informational privacy issue had 
not been before the court, there would have been no need to assign the case to a three-judge 
district court panel. See generally David P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Con-
stitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1964). 
156  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977). 
157  Id. at 591. 
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And, the Court proceeded to resolve the constitutional right to privacy is-
sue: 
Appellees contend that the statute invades a constitutionally protected 
“zone of privacy.” The cases sometimes characterized as protecting “privacy” 
have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individ-
ual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest 
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. Appellees argue 
that both of these interests are impaired by this statute. The mere existence in 
readily available form of the information about patients’ use of Schedule II 
drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will become publicly 
known and that it will adversely affect their reputations. This concern makes 
some patients reluctant to use, and some doctors reluctant to prescribe, such 
drugs even when their use is medically indicated. It follows, they argue, that the 
making of decisions about matters vital to the care of their health is inevitably 
affected by the statute. Thus, the statute threatens to impair both their interest in 
the nondisclosure of private information and also their interest in making im-
portant decisions independently. 
We are persuaded, however, that the New York program does not, on its 
face, pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitu-
tional violation.158 
The most logical interpretation of the above quote is that the Court 
acknowledged that its prior precedents, including the ones cited in footnote 25 
of its decision, established a right to constitutional privacy against “the disclo-
sure of personal matters,”159 which is the same as the claim for a constitutional 
right to informational privacy. And that, although having acknowledged such a 
constitutional right to informational privacy, the Court held that the state stat-
ute’s reporting mandate was not a sufficient enough burden to establish a viola-
tion of the constitutional right to informational privacy. 
It is also significant that, despite the Court’s contention in Nelson that the 
Whalen decision had only assumed that there was a constitutional right to in-
formational privacy, none of the justices involved in deciding Whalen articulat-
ed that such an assumption was the basis of the Whalen opinion. Instead, Jus-
tice Brennan clearly believed that the majority opinion had definitively 
established the existence of a constitutional right to informational privacy. In 
his concurring opinion, he states: 
 The New York statute under attack requires doctors to disclose to the State 
information about prescriptions for certain drugs with a high potential for abuse, 
and provides for the storage of that information in a central computer file. The 
Court recognizes that an individual’s “interest in avoiding disclosure of person-
                                                        
158  Id. at 598–600 (emphasis added). Just because the disclosures of medical information at 
issue in Whalen was, according to the Court, not “a sufficiently grievous threat . . . to estab-
lish a constitutional violation” of the right to privacy does not mean that a right to privacy—
or a liberty interest in informational privacy—did not exist; nor does it mean that Whalen 
should be narrowly interpreted to mean that it did not establish that a constitutional right to 
informational privacy generally exists. 
159  Id. 
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al matters” is an aspect of the right of privacy, but holds that in this case, any 
such interest has not been seriously enough invaded by the State to require a 
showing that its program was indispensable to the State’s effort to control drug 
abuse.160 
To counter Justice Brennan’s belief that Whalen established a constitution-
al right to informational privacy, Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion attempt-
ed to minimize the scope of the Whalen decision by labeling Justice Brennan’s 
comments—about Whalen having established a constitutional right to informa-
tional privacy—as mere dicta, given that a mass public disclosure of the pa-
tients’ names and addresses, beyond the limited disclosure to a state agency’s 
employees, was not authorized or contemplated under the relevant New York 
statute.161 
Justice Stewart relied on Katz to argue that there was no general right to 
privacy, stating: “[there exists no] “general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’. . . 
[T]he protection of a person’s general right to privacy—his right to be let alone 
by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left 
largely to the law of the individual States.”162 To support his conclusion that 
there is no “general right to privacy,” Justice Stewart proceeded to limit the 
cases that Whalen relied on in footnote 25 and 26 to the specific facts that ex-
isted in those cases, including marriage, “privacy in the home,” and “the right 
to use contraceptives.”163 Regarding Griswold, he concludes, “[w]hatever the 
ratio decidendi of Griswold, it does not recognize a general interest in freedom 
from disclosure of private information.”164 Then, he argues that Stanley v. 
Georgia165 should be limited to its First Amendment holding. He asserts: 
                                                        
160  Id. at 606. (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
161  Id. at 607–08 (Stewart, J., concurring). What Justice Stewart does not acknowledge is 
that a violation of a constitutional right to informational privacy is not implicated only by 
mass public disclosure of private information. Such a violation can occur when the govern-
ment mandates that the information be disclosed only to the government’s employees. It 
seems reasonably clear that Justice Brennan’s above-stated quote is in reference to a disclo-
sure only to the government’s employees–which were the facts at issue in Whalen and in re-
sponse to which the Whalen Court’s acknowledgement of a constitutional right to privacy is 
geared, despite the Court leaving open the issue whether a mass public disclosure of the pri-
vate information, at issue in Whalen, would have led to a different conclusion: that such 
mass distribution would have been a violation of the aggrieved parties’ privacy right, when a 
more limited disclosure to the government’s employees was not. 
Furthermore, if Whalen had only assumed, for the purpose of the case before it, that there 
was a constitutional right to informational privacy, then there would have been no need for 
or justification for the spirited debate between Justices Brennan and Stewart in their concur-
ring opinions. 
162  Id. at 607–08 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). There would be negative im-
plications from leaving the privacy issues to state law, because states, and their employees, 
are mostly the ones that are alleged to have violated the constitutional right to informational 
privacy; therefore, they might offer inadequate protection against their own challenged be-
havior. 
163  Id. at 608–09. 
164  Id. at 609. 
165  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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 The other case referred to held that an individual cannot constitutionally be 
prosecuted for possession of obscene materials in his home. Although Stanley 
makes some reference to privacy rights, the holding there was simply that the 
First Amendment—as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth—protects 
a person’s right to read what he chooses in circumstances where that choice pos-
es no threat to the sensibilities or welfare of others.166 
However, it is clear that Justice Stewart’s reasoning is mostly his attempt 
to apply a strict textual interpretation of the Constitution and of Whalen, to lim-
it the Court’s privacy jurisprudence, and to limit the scope of the cases cited in 
footnote 25 and 26. In other words, that Stanley established that the First 
Amendment protects one’s possession of obscene materials in his or her home 
is not the outer limit of the Court’s reasoning in that opinion. Justice Stewart 
does not give enough importance to some of the Court’s statements in Stan-
ley—statements that are important for a full understanding of the opinion. For 
example, the majority opinion in Stanley states: 
 It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive 
information and ideas. “This freedom (of speech and press) necessarily protects 
the right to receive.” This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of 
their social worth is fundamental to our free society. Moreover, in the context of 
this case—a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the 
privacy of a person’s own home—that right takes on an added dimension. For 
also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, 
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.167 
The Stanley Court proceeded to rely on Olmstead and the founder’s intent, 
stating, “They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the 
right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized man.”168 
Thus, a fair reading of Stanley is that, although the Court specifically held 
that the relevant obscene material was protected by the First Amendment, the 
Court also reaffirmed or re-articulated legal principles, doctrines, and Court 
precedent that it believed were controlling and relevant to a full understanding 
of its holding. These are principles, doctrines, and precedent that are relevant 
to—and that should be used in—determining whether there is a constitutional 
right to informational privacy. The most relevant of those principles is the 
                                                        
166  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
167  Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Additionally, Stanley appears to recognize a general fundamental right to be free from im-
permissible governmental intrusion, stating that, “For also fundamental is the right to be 
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into 
one’s privacy.” Id. This statement gives further support that there should be a constitutional-
ly protected liberty interest against unjustified governmental intrusions, including a constitu-
tional right to information privacy. 
168  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
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“right to be let alone” from governmental intrusion when the government has 
not shown a proper justification. 
Given the above-stated quotes from Stanley, Justice Stewart’s quotation 
from Katz169 should be given a very limited interpretation and application when 
determining whether there exists a constitutional right to informational privacy. 
That limited interpretation should make a distinction between a governmental 
intrusion and a private person’s intrusion into one’s zone of privacy. 
In that respect, one can agree with Justice Stewart that state law should, as 
with determining private property rights, be given deference in the rules that it 
establishes to protect one of its citizen’s privacy against an invasion by another 
of its citizen.170 But, no deference should be given to either state law or state 
law authority, over the subject matter of privacy, when the legal issue involves 
a conflict between state action or regulation and a private citizen’s claim that 
such action or regulation violates his or her constitutional privacy rights. The 
fundamental difference is that a state might be trusted to, and given the authori-
ty to, protect its citizens against each other—as is mostly done when a state ex-
ercises its police powers to protect its citizens from each other—but should not 
be trusted to protect its citizens from the state’s own actions or conduct. 
In this latter context, there should be some final authority whereby an ag-
grieved private citizen can obtain protection from the state’s overreaching or 
improper behavior. The Constitution offers that protection, through the Bill of 
Rights Amendments, which include prohibitions against state governments’ 
and the federal government’s improper intrusions. 
Furthermore, to fully understand Justice Stewart’s interpretation of Katz, as 
he articulated it in the Whalen opinion, one would have to put the quotation 
from Katz and the accompanying interpretation in context. The quotation from 
Katz is contained in the part of that opinion where the Court was deciding 
whether it would accept the petitioner’s formulation of the questions to be de-
cided by the Court.171 Contrary to petitioner’s request, the Court declined to 
base its opinion on a rule that the interpretation and application of the Fourth 
Amendment should be premised on whether a governmental intrusion was in a 
“constitutionally protected area.”172 Justice Stewart states: 
Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitu-
tional “right to privacy.” That Amendment protects individual privacy against 
certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often 
                                                        
169  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
170  Such deference to state privacy law appears to be the current norm as states normally 
have the authority to determine which of the standard four privacy causes of action they will 
give their citizens to protect them from another citizen’s invasion of some recognized priva-
cy rights—including state laws regarding “public disclosure of ‘private’ facts,” “intrusion 
upon seclusion,” “placing [one] in a false light,” and “appropriation of [one’s] name and 
likeness.” VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS CASES 
AND MATERIALS 1001–52 (13th ed. 2015). 
171  Katz, 389 U.S. at 349–50. 
172  Id. at 350. 
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have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution pro-
tect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protec-
tion of a person’s general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other 
people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to 
the law of the individual States.173 
When this quote from Katz—an opinion that Justice Stewart wrote—is 
considered in conjunction with his concurring opinion174 in Whalen, the most 
logical interpretation of his statements in Katz is that there are different provi-
sions of the Constitution that protect one’s privacy from different types of gov-
ernmental intrusion, and that the Fourth Amendment’s protection applies only 
to the types of governmental intrusions that involve impermissible searches and 
seizures. Other constitutional provisions guard against other types of govern-
mental intrusions (including the First Amendment and the Third Amendment) 
which are specifically referenced in footnote 5 of Katz.175 It is significant that 
in this footnote, Justice Stewart states: “Virtually every governmental action 
interferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case is 
whether that interference violates a command of the United States Constitu-
tion.”176 And, if one were to accept this statement, then he or she could con-
clude that, when no protection is offered by a particular constitutional provi-
sion, a state may provide privacy protections to its citizens, as many states 
currently provide through the four state law privacy theories that give citizens a 
civil tort claim against other citizens for violating their right of privacy.177 
However, when one considers a constitutional right to informational privacy, 
there is a provision or “command of the United States Constitution.”178 It is the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against any impermissible governmental in-
trusion into one’s private information.179 
The best way to reconcile the relevancy of the Fourth Amendment to a 
substantive due process analysis of the liberty interest provision of the Four-
teenth and Fifth Amendments is for the Court to—through a Glucksberg, Law-
rence, and Obergefell analysis—recognize that from the beginning of this 
country the Fourth Amendment has protected United States citizens from gov-
ernmental searches and seizures of private information, including compelled 
production and use of that private information.180 The Fourth Amendment and 
                                                        
173  Id. at 350–51. 
174  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607–09 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
175  Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.5. 
176  Id.  
177  See supra text accompanying note 170. 
178  Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 n.5. See also supra notes 25–85 and accompanying text. 
179  Therefore, at best, Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Whalen should be considered 
as an effort by him to limit a broader permissible interpretation of Katz, and at worst it is ir-
relevant dicta, because the quoted part of Katz—that there is no general right to be let 
alone—clearly applies only to areas of the law where there is no constitutional provision that 
offer such protection. 
180  See supra notes 25–85 and accompanying text. 
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the liberty interest of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, either separately 
or together, should be considered the major sources of a constitutional right to 
informational privacy. These amendments should be used by courts to help ex-
plain and enforce the constitutional right to informational privacy and its cen-
tral policy that the right is based on the “right to be let alone.” 
Although one might quibble about the scope of the Fourth Amendment, 
and of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, one should not be confused about 
the implications that might flow from a court’s decision holding that a litigant’s 
claim falls within the protection of one of these amendments. The implication 
is that the litigant has a “right to be let alone” unless the government has suffi-
ciently articulated a reasonable countervailing interest (normally involving a 
police power protection) that justifies the governmental intrusion.181 
It seems that the federal circuit courts of appeals are more willing than the 
U.S. Supreme Court to protect one’s right “to be let alone,” and to acknowledge 
that that right is rooted in the Constitution—although many of these courts have 
not yet articulated whether the Fourth Amendment, in addition to the liberty 
interest of the Fourteenth Amendment, is also a constitutional source that sup-
ports a right to informational privacy. 
IV. FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS’ DECISIONS 
In his concurring opinion in Nelson, Justice Scalia lamented the majority’s 
assumption of a constitutional right to informational privacy because he be-
lieved that it would lead to ambiguity in the federal circuits’ application of that 
right.182 He argued that this ambiguity would result because the Nelson Court 
did not articulate standards that were specific enough to govern the federal cir-
cuits’ efforts to resolve lawsuits alleging informational privacy claims.183 And 
to some extent his prediction has materialized. There is a division among the 
federal circuits regarding the specific standards used to evaluate informational 
privacy claims, with some circuit courts having more expansive standards for 
resolving the claims, and others having more narrow standards. But significant-
ly, substantially all of the federal circuit courts of appeals have rejected the 
Nelson Court’s interpretation of the Court’s own opinion in Whalen, which is 
quite remarkable. 
A. Federal Courts that Broadly Interpret the Right to Informational Privacy 
1. Third Circuit 
In a post-Nelson case, the Third Circuit employed standards that, to some 
extent, are more in line with the approach that this Article articulates. In Malle-
                                                        
181  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928). 
182  Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 166–69 (2011). 
183  Id. at 168. 
19 NEV. L.J. 135, PITTMAN 1/28/2019  12:15 PM 
168 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1  
 
us v. George,184 the Third Circuit held that a local school board member, who 
volunteered information to the school board about a teacher’s alleged improper 
conduct with a student, did not allege a sufficient claim that was protected by a 
constitutional right to informational privacy because the school board member 
had volunteered the information.185 However, the Third Circuit did recognize 
the availability of an informational privacy claim in an appropriate case, and 
that such a claim could be based on the “right to be let alone”186: 
This first type of privacy right is the right recognized in Justice Brandeis’s dis-
sent in Olmstead v. United States, “the right to be let alone.” “[T]he right not to 
have intimate facts concerning one’s life disclosed without one’s consent” is “a 
venerable [right] whose constitutional significance we have recognized in the 
past.” “In determining whether information is entitled to privacy protection, we 
have looked at whether it is within an individual’s reasonable expectations of 
confidentiality. The more intimate or personal the information, the more justi-
fied is the expectation that it will not be subject to public scrutiny.” We have 
deemed the following types of information to be protected: a private employee’s 
medical information when sought by the government, medical, financial and be-
havioral information relevant to a police investigator’s ability to work in dan-
gerous and stressful situations, a public employee’s medical prescription record, 
a minor student’s pregnancy status, sexual orientation, and an inmate’s HIV-
positive status. This information consists of three categories: sexual information, 
medical information, and some financial information. While this is not an ex-
haustive list, it is clear that the privacy right is limited to facts and an individu-
al’s interest in not disclosing those facts about himself or herself. It is the right 
to refrain from sharing intimate facts about oneself.187 
The court’s decision, being based on Olmstead, shows how expansively the 
Third Circuit has interpreted the existence and scope of a constitutional right to 
informational privacy to include “sexual information,” “medical information,” 
and, “some financial information.”188 The Malleus opinion shows two things 
that are important to a constitutional right to informational privacy. First, unlike 
the Court in Nelson, the Third Circuit in Malleus recognized that Whalen clear-
ly established a constitutional right to informational privacy.189 Second, the 
                                                        
184  Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 2011). 
185  Id. at 565–66. The Seventh Circuit has asserted that it did not adopt the position that one 
who volunteers the disclosure of private information could not raise a valid constitutional 
informational privacy claim if the information is further disclosed to the public. Chasensky 
v. Walker, 740 F.3d 1088, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014). 
186  Malleus, 641 F.3d at 564–65. 
187  Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
188  Id. at 565. 
189  Id. at 564. Citing Whalen as precedent, the Third Circuit stated:  
Traditionally, the Fourteenth Amendment has protected two types of privacy rights. First, it pro-
tects “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” This category protects 
against disclosure of certain personal information, including: information containing specific 
“details of one’s personal life,” information “which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain 
within the private enclave where he may lead a private life,” and information containing “inti-
mate facts of a personal nature.” 
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court did not try to limit the scope of a privacy claim to one that asserts an un-
derlying fundamental right to privacy, or to one that falls within the scope of 
Griswold’s intimate sexual or familial relationship privacy interest, as some 
circuits have done.190 Instead, the Third Circuit cited some of its own prece-
dent, including those where the court had found certain private financial infor-
mation to be within the protection of a constitutional right to informational pri-
vacy, despite the fact that the claim neither involved a fundamental right nor an 
intimate sexual relationship.191 In the Third Circuit, the decisive determinant of 
whether a claim raises a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to informa-
tional privacy issue is whether the private information, into which the govern-
ment intrudes, “is within an individual’s reasonable expectations of confidenti-
ality. The more intimate or personal the information, the more justified is the 
expectation that it will not be subject to public scrutiny.”192 
2. Seventh Circuit 
In another post-Nelson case, the Seventh Circuit also broadly interpreted 
Whalen, despite the Supreme Court’s allegation in Nelson that Whalen only as-
sumed that there was a constitutional right to informational privacy.193 In 
Chasensky v. Walker,194 the Seventh Circuit stated: 
Indeed, it is true that “[t]he courts of appeals, including this court, have inter-
preted Whalen to recognize a constitutional right to the privacy of medical, sex-
ual, financial, and perhaps other categories of highly personal information—
information that most people are reluctant to disclose to strangers—and have 
held that the right is defeasible only upon proof of a strong public interest in ac-
cess to or dissemination of the information.”195 
                                                                                                                                
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
190  Id. 
191  Id. at 565. 
192  Id. at 564 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
193  Chasensky v. Walker, 740 F.3d 1088, 1096 (7th Cir. 2014). 
194  Id. 
195  Id. at 1096 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). In Chasensky, the Seventh Circuit 
cited one of its earlier opinions, Wolfe v. Schaefer, 619 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2010), wherein it 
observed that the Supreme Court’s opinions on the presence or absence of a constitutional 
right to informational privacy have not been entirely clear. The Wolfe court stated:  
The Court has never held that the disclosure of private information denies due process. But in 
Whalen it did suggest that there might be a due process right to the nondisclosure of certain pri-
vate information, though it upheld the law challenged in that case: a law that required a copy of 
every prescription for certain drugs that have both lawful and unlawful uses (methadone, for ex-
ample) to be filed with state health authorities. A contemporaneous decision[] was more explicit 
about the existence of a constitutional right of privacy in personal papers, but again the plaintiff 
lost. 
The courts of appeals, including this court, have interpreted Whalen to recognize a constitutional 
right to the privacy of medical, sexual, financial, and perhaps other categories of highly personal 
information—information that most people are reluctant to disclose to strangers—and have held 
that the right is defeasible only upon proof of a strong public interest in access to or dissemina-
tion of the information. The Supreme Court, in contrast, has seemed more interested in limiting 
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The court proceeded to hold that the information revealing that the peti-
tioner had previously filed for bankruptcy was not protected by a constitutional 
right to informational privacy because the information was publicly availa-
ble.196 
3. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit opinions are consistent with the Third and Seventh 
Circuits’ opinions. In Doe v. New York,197 the court asserted: “In Whalen v. 
Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that there exists in the United States Con-
stitution a right to privacy protecting ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclo-
sure of personal matters.’ ”198 Although Doe v. New York was decided before 
Nelson, the Second Circuit, in Palkimas v. Bella,199 a post-Nelson opinion, reaf-
firmed that it still interprets Whalen as establishing: “There is []a recognized 
constitutional right to privacy in personal information . . . characterized as a 
right to ‘confidentiality.’ ”200 
                                                                                                                                
the right of informational privacy than in its recognition and enforcement. It has held that reputa-
tion is not part of the liberty that the due process clauses protect, even though concern with repu-
tation is one of the principal reasons people don’t want personal information about themselves 
broadcast to strangers. It has held that the First Amendment forbids a state to punish broadcast-
ing the name of a murdered rape victim if her name is in judicial records open to public inspec-
tion. Even the publicizing of highly personal information that is not in a record open to public 
inspection is privileged if there is a public interest in access to the information. 
The rejection in Paul v. Davis of a liberty or property interest in reputation casts doubt on the 
propriety of basing a federal constitutional right to informational privacy on a state’s decision to 
recognize such privacy as a species of liberty or property. Paul illustrates the modern Supreme 
Court’s expansive view of freedom of speech and of the press, a view that casts doubt on any ef-
fort to limit the public disclosure of personal information, however private. But the Court has not 
yet completely extinguished state-law protections, whether common law or statutory, against 
publication of intimate details of people’s private lives in which other people might be interest-
ed. True, not extinguishing a private right is not the same thing as elevating it to a constitutional 
right. Yet there is an air of paradox in giving constitutional protection in the name of privacy to 
conduct that stretches the ordinary understanding of the concept of privacy, yet denying it to in-
tensely private information, which is at the concept’s core. Maybe the Supreme Court will clari-
fy the issue in Nelson v. NASA, in which, as we noted, it recently granted certiorari. 
Wolfe, 619 F.3d at 784–86 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
196  Chasensky, 740 F.3d at 1096–97. 
197  Doe v. New York, 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994). 
198  Id. at 267. 
199  Palkimas v. Bella, 510 F. App’x 64 (2d Cir. 2013). 
200  Id. at 66. Although Palkimas is an unpublished decision, some federal district courts in 
the Second Circuit have relied on it as precedent and adopted its use of an intermediate level 
of scrutiny when balancing one’s right of informational privacy against an asserted govern-
mental interest. See Miron v. Stratford, 976 F. Supp. 2d 120, 139 (D. Conn. 2013) (citing 
Palkimas for support that a balancing test should be applied to a constitutional right to in-
formational privacy); O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2005) (using in-
termediate scrutiny in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals). 
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4. Fourth Circuit  
The Fourth Circuit is another circuit that broadly holds that the liberty in-
terest of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a constitutional right to informa-
tional privacy, premised on “the right to be let alone.” That court, in Walls v. 
Petersburg,201 relies on Whalen, Olmstead, and a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy as the authorities supporting the constitutional right to informational pri-
vacy: 
As the first step in determining whether the information sought is entitled to pri-
vacy protection, courts have looked at whether it is within an individual’s rea-
sonable expectations of confidentiality. The more intimate or personal the in-
formation, the more justified is the expectation that it will not be subject to 
public scrutiny. The right to keep one’s beliefs and thoughts and emotions and 
sensations secure, and, as against the government, private was described by 
Justice Brandeis as “the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized man.” Personal, private information in 
which an individual has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality is protected 
by one’s constitutional right to privacy.202 
Further, the Fourth Circuit applies “strict scrutiny” to state laws violating 
the right to informational privacy.203 
                                                        
201  Walls v. Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990). 
202  Id. at 192 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
203  Id. at 192. The Walls court stated:  
The right to privacy, however, is not absolute. If the information is protected by a person’s right 
to privacy, then the defendant has the burden to prove that a compelling governmental interest in 
disclosure outweighs the individual’s privacy interest. As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
“compelling” is the key word. When the decision or the information sought is “fundamental,” 
regulation “may be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to 
express only those interests.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Whether a “balancing approach” or “strict scrutiny” should be used is an important consider-
ation. The Fourth Circuit appears to apply strict scrutiny even when the underlying issues do 
not involve a “fundamental right.” Walls, 895 F.2d at 192. The mere fact that the plaintiff is 
challenging the public disclosure of confidential private information is enough to warrant 
strict scrutiny. Id. On the other hand, some federal circuits use a “balancing approach.” 
Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891, 900 (9th Cir. 2014). The Second Circuit uses an intermediate 
level of scrutiny by determining whether “a substantial governmental interest outweighs the 
burdened privacy right.” O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2005). See al-
so Skinner-Thompson, supra note 94, at 195–201 (discussing some of the different types of 
balancing tests that different federal courts use). The difference in the approaches has im-
portant implications on whether a court will or will not find that a state law is a violation of 
the constitutional right to informational privacy. 
For example, if the Court had used strict scrutiny in Whalen, it is likely (or at least possible) 
that it would have found that the reporting of the names and addresses of the patients in 
Whalen was a violation of their right to informational privacy given that there was no show-
ing that the state law was narrowly tailored with no less restrictive alternatives to protect its 
interest. Perhaps there were less restrictive alternatives, such as reporting the relevant medi-
cal information without the patients’ names and addresses being disclosed. 
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5. Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit, in Douglas v. Dobbs,204 held that there is a constitution-
al right to informational privacy, in part relying on Whalen: “Our jurisprudence 
has made clear that ‘[t]here is a constitutional right to privacy in preventing 
disclosure by the government of personal matters.’ In so deciding, we have in-
terpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Whalen v. Roe as creating a right to 
privacy in certain personal information.”205 And the court proceeded to extend 
that right to privacy to a person’s pharmacy records at a local pharmacy, assert-
ing that “it seems clear that privacy in prescription records falls within a pro-
tected ‘zone of privacy’ and is thus protected as a personal right either ‘funda-
mental’ to or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ”206 
6. Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit, in Wyatt v. Fletcher,,207 also recognized that: 
 Later, in Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court identified two separate interests 
that fall under the constitutional right to privacy. The one of relevance to us is 
the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” by the gov-
                                                        
204  Douglas v. Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2005). 
205  Id. at 1101 (citations omitted). 
206  Id. at 1102. However, the court held that the defendants in Douglas were entitled to have 
the section 1983 claim against them dismissed under qualified immunity because the plain-
tiff did not establish that it was clearly established that a prosecutor, who approved a motion 
and order that were subsequently presented by a police officer to a magistrate judge for a 
warrant, violates the right to privacy. Id. at 1103. 
In Pyle v. Woods, the Tenth Circuit cited Douglas without calling into question its interpreta-
tion of Whalen in Douglas. See Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017). This 
implies that the Tenth Circuit has not allowed Nelson to cloud its interpretation of Whalen. 
In Pyle, just as in Douglas, the court held that the complaining party had a constitutional 
right to informational privacy, but that the defendant was entitled to dismissal of the section 
1983 claim because it was not clearly established that a law enforcement officer violated the 
Fourth Amendment when he conducted a warrantless search of pharmacy records that were 
contained in a state database. Id. at 1264. 
207  Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2013). Although the Fifth Circuit in Wyatt 
acknowledged that Whalen recognized a constitutional right to informational privacy, it 
found that certain school officials should be granted qualified immunity to a section 1983 
claim because there was no “clearly established” law that a school official’s disclosure of a 
student’s homosexual orientation to the student’s parents was a violation of the student’s 
constitutional right to informational privacy. Id. at 508. The court’s decision was based on 
the fact that the student was a minor. Id. at 508–09. This decision implies that school offi-
cials have more authority to disclose private information to parents of minor children than 
disclosing information about adult children—given that the court distinguished its opinion 
from an opinion of another circuit, on the grounds that the other circuit might have ruled dif-
ferently if the aggrieved person had been a minor instead of an adult. Id. (citing Sterling v. 
Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2000)) (finding that a police officer’s disclo-
sure of an 18-year-old adult’s sexual orientation to the adult’s grandfather was a violation of 
the latter’s constitutional right of informational privacy). 
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ernment. This confidentiality interest has been defined as “the right to be free 
from the government disclosing private facts about its citizens.”208 
However, the court did note that the Court has not frequently spoken on this 
issue.209 
7. Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit, being formerly a part of the Fifth Circuit, appears to 
follow the same broad approach by relying on Fifth Circuit precedent. For ex-
ample, in an unreported post-Nelson opinion, Burns v. Warden,210 the Eleventh 
Circuit—without deciding whether a constitutional right to privacy exists—
stated: “In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional inter-
est ‘in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’ In 1978, the former Fifth Cir-
cuit agreed that a ‘constitutional right to privacy’ was ‘incorporated in the due 
process protected’ by the Fourteenth Amendment.”211 
In an earlier opinion, Hester v. Milledgeville,212 the Eleventh Circuit, again 
relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, more definitely held that there is a constitu-
tional right to informational privacy.213 
B. Federal Courts that Narrowly Interpret the Right to Informational Privacy 
1. First Circuit  
The First Circuit is one federal circuit that limits its acceptance of, and the 
scope of, a constitutional right to informational privacy, primarily relying on 
the ambiguity the Court created in Nelson when it only assumed a right to in-
formational privacy. In Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr.,214 the court held that a 
prison system change in how prisoners with the HIV virus receive their HIV 
medication did not violate any constitutional right to informational privacy that 
the prisoners might possess,215 despite that the manner in which the prisoners 
would receive their HIV medication might disclose their HIV status, which the 
prisoners contended should be protected by the constitutional right to informa-
tional privacy.216 The court, citing Whalen, stated: “The Supreme Court has 
implied that the Constitution might protect in some circumstances ‘the individ-
                                                        
208  Id. at 505 (citations omitted). 
209  Id. 
210  Burns v. Warden, 482 F. App’x 414 (11th Cir. 2012). 
211  Id. at 417. 
212  Hester v. Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985). 
213  Id. at 1497. The court stated: “The ‘individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters’ is protected by the ‘confidentiality strand’ of the constitutional right to privacy.” Id. 
(citation omitted) (citing Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979)). 
214  Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 766 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2014). 
215  Id. at 143–44. 
216  Id. 
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ual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’ from government in-
fringement.”217 However, the court also referenced Nelson as “assuming, but 
declining to confirm, ‘that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort 
mentioned in Whalen.’ ”218 
The First Circuit further limited the constitutional right to informational 
privacy by refusing to apply “strict scrutiny” to such claims, because it inter-
preted Nelson as requiring that governmental intrusions have only a rational ba-
sis.219 
2. Ninth Circuit 
In Coons v. Lew,220 the Ninth Circuit interprets Whalen as establishing a 
constitutional right to informational privacy.221 However, the court noted that 
the right is not absolute, and it used a five-factor analysis for determining when 
a constitutional violation occurs: 
In order “to determine whether the governmental interest in obtaining infor-
mation outweighs the individual’s privacy interest,” we weigh the following fac-
tors: “(1) the type of information requested, (2) the potential for harm in any 
subsequent non-consensual disclosure, (3) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent 
unauthorized disclosure, (4) the degree of the need for access, and (5) whether 
there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recog-
nizable public interest militating toward access.”222 
3. Eight Circuit 
The Eight Circuit held that Whalen established a constitutional right to in-
formational privacy, which it notes has mostly been classified as a right to 
“confidentiality.”223 However, in Cooksey v. Boyer,224 the court appears to de-
fine the scope of the right to informational privacy more narrowly than other 
federal circuits, as it seems to limit the protection only to informational privacy 
claims that allege governmental intrusion where “the information disclosed 
must be either a shocking degradation or an egregious humiliation.”225 The 
                                                        
217  Id. at 143 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)). 
218  Id. (quoting Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011)). 
219  Id. at 144. The First Circuit noted that in Nelson, the Court did not require that the ques-
tions in the questionnaire be necessary, or more narrowly constructed. Therefore, the gov-
ernment did not have to establish that there was no less restrictive alternative to the new 
method of distributing HIV drugs—one that would not disclose the prisoner’s HIV status. Id. 
220  Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2014). 
221  Id. at 900. 
222  Id. The court proceeded to find that no violation occurred in Coons because the individu-
al mandate did not force petitioner to disclose any private information. Id. at 900–01. 
223  Cooksey v. Boyer, 289 F.3d 513, 515 (8th Cir. 2002). 
224  Id. 
225  Id. at 516. The Eighth Circuit also cited Supreme Court precedent that it believed estab-
lished that privacy claims should be limited to areas involving fundamental rights and rights 
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court recognized that its approach is narrower and has a more limited scope of 
protection than some circuits that only require that the disclosed information 
intrude upon the aggrieved party’s reasonable expectation of privacy.226 The 
court also acknowledged that its standards “set a high bar and implicitly hold 
that many disclosures, regardless of their nature, will not reach the level of a 
constitutional violation.”227 
4. Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit has finally recognized that Whalen establishes a constitu-
tional right to informational privacy.228 However, it has imposed one of the 
most exacting standards for applying that right to a disclosure of private infor-
mation; and therefore, it requires substantially more discussion than that which 
this Article gives to other circuits. In a post-Nelson case, Kenny v. Bartman,229 
the Sixth Circuit stated: 
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to privacy that includes 
an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” However, we 
have held that the right to informational privacy extends only to matters that im-
plicate a fundamental liberty interest. A two-part test applies to claims that al-
lege a violation of the right to informational privacy: “(1) the interest at stake 
must implicate either a fundamental right or one implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty; and (2) the government’s interest in disseminating the information 
must be balanced against the individual’s interest in keeping the information 
private.” Indeed, “we have recognized a constitutionally-protected information-
al-privacy interest in only two circumstances: (1) where the release of personal 
                                                                                                                                
that are considered a part of “ordered liberty” Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S 693, 713 
(1976)). 
226  Id. In noting that some circuits do not limit informational privacy coverage to those dis-
closures that are a “shocking degradation or an egregious humiliation,” the Eight Circuit cit-
ed Sheets v. Salt Lake, 45 F.3d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir. 1995) as “finding potential constitu-
tional violation in disclosure of diary contents even where the ‘information is not extremely 
sensitive in nature [nor] particularly controversial or embarrassing.’ ” Id. (alteration in origi-
nal). 
227  Id. at 516. In applying the standard to the facts in Cooksey, the court stated: 
Applying these standards to the case at bar, we agree with the district court that no constitutional 
violation occurred. The legitimate interest in ensuring Cooksey’s fitness for duty could certainly 
have been handled more professionally. However, the information disclosed and the circum-
stances of disclosure are neither shockingly degrading or egregiously humiliating. Cooksey was 
a high ranking law enforcement officer in a politically charged, small town. The only infor-
mation disclosed was the fact that he was being treated by a psychologist for stress. Because the 
field of law enforcement is generally recognized as inherently stressful, it follows that the deci-
sion to seek treatment for that stress cannot be characterized as egregiously humiliating. Further, 
in this case, the Board’s reinstatement of Cooksey as chief of police is strong evidence against 
Cooksey’s assertion that he was stigmatized by the disclosure. 
Id. 
228  Kenny v. Bartman, No. 16-2152, 2017 WL 3613601, at *6 (6th Cir. May 19, 2017). 
229  Id. at *1. 
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information may lead to bodily harm, and (2) where the released information re-
lates to matters ‘of a sexual, personal, and humiliating nature.’ ”230 
To support its “fundamental rights” and “ordered liberty” limitation, the 
court in Bartman relied on a prior Sixth Circuit case, J.P. v. DeSanti,231 which 
is based on the Court’s decision in Paul v. Davis232 and Roe v. Wade.233 Roe is 
cited for the proposition that “[t]hese decisions make it clear that only personal 
rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’ ” are protected.234 And, Paul, simply cites the same language from 
Roe.235 However, Roe and its language, regarding “fundamental rights” and 
“ordered liberty,” are best restricted to Whalen’s “individual autonomy” prong 
because the Roe Court used that language in determining whether a woman has 
a constitutional right to an abortion;236 this “individual autonomy” language is 
contained in a separate area of constitutional privacy, outside the scope of the 
“avoiding disclosure of personal matters” prong.237 Immediately before using 
the “fundamental right” and “ordered liberty” language, the Roe Court analyzed 
some of its prior decisions where it found an individual right to privacy, and 
those cases mostly involved such constitutional amendments as the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.238 
The Court then asserted that, whether based on the liberty interest of the Four-
teenth Amendment or the Ninth Amendment, a woman’s right to an abortion is 
                                                        
230  Id. (citations omitted). 
231  J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1088 (6th Cir. 1981). 
232  Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
233  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
234  Id. at 152. 
235  Paul, 424 U.S. at 713. 
236  Roe, 410 U.S. at 152−53. Several federal circuit court of appeals’ opinions have used the 
label “individual autonomy” when referring to the part of Whalen that discusses “the interest 
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions,” which is one of the privacy 
prongs that Whalen recognizes. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1061 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (asserting that “In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court declared that the constitu-
tional right to privacy grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment respects not only individual 
autonomy in intimate matters, but also the individual’s interest in avoiding divulgence of 
highly personal information.”) (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599–600). See also New York 
State Ophthalmological Soc’y V. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1379, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (using both 
the phrase “decision-making” and “individual autonomy” to refer to the prong of Whalen 
that involves privacy in making intimate decisions.); Flood v. Phillips, 90 F. App’x 108, 116 
(6th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that Petitioner enjoys privacy rights of 
‘selective disclosure’ and individual autonomy.”) (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599–600, 
n.26). The other privacy prong of Whalen is the “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters,” which is the basis of the constitutional right to informational privacy that is the 
subject of this Article. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599–600, n.26. When this Article uses “decision-
making” and “individual autonomy” to refer to Whalen’s privacy “interest in independence 
in making certain kinds of important decisions,” the above-cited opinions can be considered 
some of the sources of these phrases which appear to be approaching the status of being 
terms of art. 
237  Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, 599−600 n.25–26 (1977). 
238  Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
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included in the right of privacy.239 And, Paul’s citation to Roe for the “funda-
mental right” and “ordered liberty” concept is best interpreted as the Court’s 
struggle to define the scope of an individual right to privacy in the early devel-
opment of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area. 
For example, in Paul, the Court held that there was not a violation of a 
right of privacy when the government included petitioner’s mug shot and name 
in a publication that was circulated to merchants warning them of potential 
shoplifters.240 In reaching that conclusion, the Court cited Roe for the proposi-
tion that “[i]n Roe the Court pointed out that the personal rights found in this 
guarantee of personal privacy must be limited to those which are ‘fundamental’ 
or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ”241 
However, the Roe Court also said something else that is relevant: “They al-
so make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education.”242 
A plausible interpretation of Roe is that one has a constitutional right to 
privacy in decisions involving procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education; and therefore, governmental intrusions in these 
areas must be balanced against the person’s constitutional right to make such 
decisions.243 In other words, the statements in Roe (referencing or mandating 
that only “fundamental rights” or rights implicit in “ordered liberty” are entitled 
to constitutional privacy protections) define only Whalen’s “decision-making” 
or “individual autonomy” privacy prong, and not the “avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters” prong. This conclusion is borne out by Whalen’s Footnote 26 
citation to Roe and other intimate relationship cases, such as Griswold, to sup-
port the existence of the decision-making privacy prong.244 The Whalen Court 
cites a totally different set of cases in Footnote 25 to support the constitutional 
right to informational privacy,245 with such cases being premised primarily on 
the “right to be let alone” instead of cases stating that the right must be a “fun-
damental right” or one that is implicit in “ordered liberty.”246 
                                                        
239  Id. at 153. 
240  Paul, 424 U.S. at 713. 
241  Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
242  Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53 (citations omitted). Such is tantamount to the “individual auton-
omy” prong the Court used in Whalen to describe one of the two sources of one’s right to 
privacy. 
243  Id. 
244  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 n.26 (1977). 
245  Id. at 599 n.25. 
246  Id. It seems that the Sixth Circuit objectives in imposing a “fundamental right” or “or-
dered liberty” right requirement on a constitutional right to informational privacy is to limit 
the number of, and type of, lawsuits that one can bring to assert a constitutional right to pri-
vacy. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (1981) (“The Framers rejected a provision in the 
Constitution under which the Supreme Court would have reviewed all legislation for its con-
stitutionality. They cannot have intended that the federal courts become involved in an in-
quiry nearly as broad—balancing almost every act of government, both state and federal, 
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Further, the Sixth Circuit, in DeSanti, relied on Justice Stewart’s concur-
ring opinion in Whalen and Nixon.247 But, as described above, Justice Stewart’s 
comments against Justice Brennan’s assertion—that a subsequent public disclo-
sure of the collected prescriptions “would clearly implicate constitutionally 
protected privacy rights”248—seem to be based on his belief that there must be 
a specifically identified provision of the Constitution that is alleged as the 
source of any articulated right to privacy.249 This is the clear import of the as-
terisk footnote citation to the Supreme Court cases that Justice Stewart refer-
enced in his Whalen concurrence.250 
Thus, in his concurring opinion, it appears that Justice Stewart was pri-
marily concerned about the distinction between a “general right to privacy” 
versus a “specific right to privacy,” which appears to be the Sixth Circuit’s 
concern in DeSanti.251 The best read of his concurring opinion is that, just like 
in the opinions cited in his asterisk footnote in Whalen, if one can pinpoint an 
amendment of the Constitution that contains a specific right to privacy, then the 
Court will evaluate whether a particular governmental intrusion violated that 
right. 
However, the most important part of Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion 
may be his reference in his asterisk footnote, stating that the Fifth Amendment 
“[to] some extent” may be supportive of “the right of each individual ‘to a pri-
vate enclave where he may lead a private life.’ ”252 For that proposition, he cites 
Tehan v. Shott.253 In Shott, the Court decided to not give retrospective applica-
tion to its holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in-
cludes improper comments, by a judge or prosecutor, regarding the accused 
having exercised his right to not speak.254 In reaching its decisions, the Court 
reemphasized the value of one’s right against self-incrimination: 
And finally, insofar as strict application of the federal privilege against self-
incrimination reflects the Constitution’s concern for the essential values repre-
sented by “our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the 
right of each individual ‘to a private enclave where he may lead a private life,’  ” 
                                                                                                                                
against its intrusion on a concept so vague, undefinable, and all-encompassing as individual 
privacy.”). 
247  Id. at 1088–89. 
248  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 608 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
249  Id. at 607 (making this argument in his asterisk footnote in his concurring opinion). 
There is no indication that Justice Stewart was primarily asserting that fundamental rights 
and rights implicit in ordered liberty are the only rights that are within the scope of the pri-
vacy that the Constitution protects. Id. 
250  Id. 
251  DeSanti, 653 F.3d at 1088 (“However, the fact that the Constitution protects several spe-
cific aspects of individual privacy does not mean that it protects all aspects of individual pri-
vacy.”). 
252  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 (citation omitted). 
253  Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 608 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). 
254  Shott, 382 U.S. at 419. 
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any impingement upon those values resulting from a State’s application of a var-
iant from the federal standard cannot now be remedied.255 
In further discussing the value of the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the Court, in footnote 12, referred to the privilege as an “important advance in 
the development of our liberty”; “reflect[ing] many of our fundamental values 
and most noble aspirations”; “our unwillingness to subject those suspected of 
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation.”256 And that “our sense of fair 
play . . . dictates ‘a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to 
leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him.’ ”257 In 
making this statement, the Court, in Shott, cited the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ decision in United States v. Grunewald258 where the Second Circuit 
stated: 
 The foes of the privilege—beginning with Bentham—have mistakenly 
viewed it solely from a procedural angle; so considered, it seems to them an un-
justifiable obstacle to the judicial ascertainment of the truth. They ignore the fact 
that the privilege—like the constitutional barrier to unreasonable searches, or 
the client’s privilege against disclosure of his confidential disclosures to his 
lawyer—has, inter alia, an important “substantive” value, as a safeguard of the 
individual’s “substantive” right of privacy, a right to a private enclave where he 
may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy. The totali-
tarian regimes scornfully reject that right. They regard privacy as an offense 
against the state. Their goal is utter depersonalization. They seek to convert all 
that is private into the totally public, to wipe out all unique “private worlds,” 
leaving a “public world” only, a la Orwell’s terrifying book, “1984.” They boast 
of the resultant greater efficiency in obtaining all the evidence in criminal prose-
cutions. We should know by now that their vaunted efficiency too often yields 
unjust, cruel decisions, based upon unreliable evidence procured at the sacrifice 
of privacy. We should beware of moving in the direction of totalitarian methods, 
as we will do if we eviscerate any of the great constitutional privileges.259 
To support its contention that the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth 
Amendment are premised on a privacy right against governmental intrusion—
which is essentially a right, “to be let alone”—the Second Circuit in Grunewald 
cited a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Brock v. United States.260 There, the 
Fifth Circuit, in discussing the principles and polices that the founder’s intend-
                                                        
255  Id. at 415–16. 
256  Id. at 414 n.12. 
257  Id. 
258  United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581−82 (2d Cir. 1956); In Grunewald, the 
Supreme Court held that the district court improperly instructed the jury that it could consid-
er the fact that the petitioner, who testified at his trial, had asserted his privilege against self-
incrimination when called to testify regarding the same questions at a grand jury proceeding. 
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 424 (1957). 
259  Grunewald, 233 F.2d at 581−82 (emphasis added). 
260  Brock v. United States, 223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955). In Brock, the issue was whether a 
federal agent violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when he seized a still and 
looked into a window of his home to obtain evidence of illegal activity without having a 
warrant to do so. Id. at 682–83. 
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ed to promote by enacting the Bill of Rights—including the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments—noted that a fundamental policy was to “give the courts of this 
country the authority, in James Madison’s immortal phrase, ‘to oblige the gov-
ernment to control itself.’ ”261 And, that the purpose of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, like other amendments of the Bill of Rights, is to protect the pri-
vacy of one’s “home, papers and effects,” which the court stated “is indispen-
sable to individual dignity and self respect.”262 
Therefore, the gist of the Second Circuit’s statements in Grunewald, and 
the Fifth Circuit’s statement in Brock, is that the purpose of certain amend-
ments of the Bill of Rights—including the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 
self-incrimination and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures—is to protect one’s private thoughts and personal 
home, property and effects from unwanted governmental intrusion unless such 
intrusion is justified by the government’s establishing that it has met the appro-
priate standard for such intrusion. These protections espoused by the Bill of 
Rights Amendments are tantamount to a right “to be let alone” unless the gov-
ernment has met appropriate standards for intrusion. 
As such, the relevancy—of Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Whalen 
(that the Fifth Amendment provides for a zone of privacy), of the Second Cir-
cuit’s similar conclusion in Gruenwald, and of the Fifth Circuit’s statement in 
Brock (relating to privacy being protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment)—is that, in addition to the privilege against self-incrimination portion of 
the Fifth Amendment, other portions of the Amendment should be deemed to 
offer similar privacy protection; this protection includes the portion of the 
Amendment stating that one cannot be denied “life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”263 To the extent that courts are hesitant to find a constitu-
tional right to informational privacy without attaching it to a specific constitu-
tional amendment, the “liberty” portion of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments could provide the source for such protection. However, for those courts 
that need something other than “liberty,” the Fourth Amendment is the most 
appropriate constitutional source. 
5. District of Columbia 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court is hesitant to recognize a constitu-
tional right to information privacy. In Franklin v. District of Columbia,264 the 
D.C. Circuit held that Spanish-speaking prisoners did not have a constitutional 
right to privacy that would have mandated that the prison provide Spanish-
speaking medical providers.265 The Court implied that Whalen would have been 
                                                        
261  Id. at 684. 
262  Id. 
263  U.S CONST. amend. V. 
264  Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
265  Id. at 638–39. 
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applicable only to a disclosure to the state, and not to a specific type of gov-
ernmental employee.266 But, the primary reason why the D.C. Circuit did not 
find that the Spanish-speaking prisoners had a constitutional right to have 
Spanish-speaking medical providers is that the court believed that such a right 
would have imposed too much of a financial burden on the prison, given that it 
had limited financial resources and that it would have to provide a different 
type of medical provider for each group of prisoners who spoke a different lan-
guage.267 Additionally, the court believed that it should not recognize a consti-
tutional right to privacy unless the right was grounded in a specific constitu-
tional amendment.268 
Despite holding that the Spanish-speaking prisoners did not have a consti-
tutional right to privacy, the court did make one observation that is important to 
the central thesis of this Article—that the Fourth Amendment can serve as the 
basis for a constitutional right to informational privacy: 
Exactly where in the Constitution this right is located the court did not say. One 
place might be the Fourth Amendment. But the Supreme Court has held that the 
expectation of privacy of those incarcerated is severely diminished, so much so 
that a “right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally 
incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells 
required to ensure institutional security and internal order.” Besides, we cannot 
understand how a prisoner’s telling another, bilingual prisoner about his symp-
toms could amount to an unreasonable search or seizure by the District.269 
                                                        
266  Id. at 638. (“What plaintiffs actually advocate, therefore, is the creation of a constitution-
al right for non-English speaking prisoners to disclose their medical condition only to certain 
government employees. This is an odd formulation: when recognized in the past, the consti-
tutional right of privacy has protected against disclosure to the state.”). 
267  Id. 
268  Id. at 637 n.12 (“ ‘Courts do not’—should not—‘adjudicate generalized claims of uncon-
stitutionality, but rather resolve constitutional questions by applying these settled doctrines 
to specific constitutional claims asserted under specific constitutional clauses’ ”). It should 
be noted that the prisoners’ alleged informational privacy violation was that, without Span-
ish-speaking medical providers, they would have to disclose their medical information to 
correctional officials or other prisoners who would then translate that information to English-
speaking medical providers. The court believed that such disclosure to correctional officials 
and other prisoners, for translation purposes, was just “one of the ordinary incidents of pris-
on life.” Id. at 638. 
269  Id. at 637 (citation omitted). In an earlier case, the D.C. Circuit, in Am. Fed’n of Gov’t 
Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., described Whalen and Nixon as being “Delphic”; the 
court “decline[d] to enter the fray by concluding that there is no such constitutional right be-
cause in this case that conclusion is unnecessary.” 118 F.3d 786, 791, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
But, the court did recognize that other federal circuit courts—except the then-Sixth Circuit—
had held that the above-referenced Supreme Court precedent did establish a constitutional 
right to informational privacy. Id. at 792−93. However, despite the D.C. Circuit’s criticism, 
the central thesis of this Article is that the cited Supreme Court cases in footnote 25 of 
Whalen, as well as the Court’s acknowledgements in Nixon, do show that the Court defini-
tively stated, held, or otherwise sufficiently recognized a constitutional right to informational 
privacy. 
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Perhaps, the court was correct in not finding a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion regarding the Spanish-speaking prisoners in Franklin. However, the mere 
fact that it mentioned that the Fourth Amendment could possibly be a source 
for a constitutional right to informational privacy enhances the central thesis of 
this Article. At the very least, it means that such a thesis is not outside of the 
bounds of permissible arguments for and courts’ consideration of the validity of 
a constitutional right to informational privacy claim premised on the Fourth 
Amendment. 
V. SPECIFIC STANDARDS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL 
PRIVACY CLAIM 
A. A Broad Interpretation of the Constitutional Right to Informational 
Privacy is Necessary for Maximum Privacy Protection 
In Part I, this Article discussed four potential privacy violations, many of 
which have already occurred.270 To each of these possible claims, the broadest 
interpretation of a constitutional right to informational privacy should be avail-
able to one when a state government or the federal government has obtained, or 
attempted to obtain, his or her private information in which there is a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy. In other words, the broad approach that the Third, 
Seventh, Second, Fourth, Tenth, and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals271 use is 
the preferable approach. First, this broad approach does not require that one’s 
private information involve a “fundamental right,” or that the information be 
implicit in the “ordered liberty” concept. Instead, these federal circuits require 
only that the private information be such that the owner of the information has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.272 
This reasonable expectation of privacy approach is the appropriate ap-
proach because, as this Article argues, the Fourth Amendment should be adopt-
ed as the most logical and persuasive source for the constitutional right to in-
formation privacy, which through the “liberty” clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is made applicable to the States;273 therefore, an aggrieved person, 
who wants to challenge a state governmental intrusion into that person’s private 
information, should be able to bring a violation of a constitutional right to in-
formational privacy claim. 
That the Fourth Amendment is the appropriate constitutional source for the 
informational privacy claim is further buttressed by the fact that, as in a crimi-
nal law search and seizure context, the more expansive federal circuit courts 
have adopted the reasonable expectation of privacy standard for determining 
when a constitutional right to informational privacy exists. Therefore, the use 
                                                        
270  See supra notes 11–23 and accompanying text. 
271  See supra notes 184–209 and accompanying text. 
272  See supra notes 184–209 and accompanying text. 
273  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
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of the Fourth Amendment as the source of the constitutional right to informa-
tional privacy would not be a far stretch, especially given that the Supreme 
Court in Whalen used Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion in Olmstead, a 
Fourth Amendment case, as a major authority for the Whalen Court’s conclu-
sion that one aspect of privacy includes the “avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters” interest, which is the same interest as the constitutional right to infor-
mational privacy. 
Furthermore, in addition to the adoption of the broadest interpretation of 
the constitutional right to informational privacy, courts should apply “strict 
scrutiny” to an alleged violation of the right. Presently, many federal circuit 
courts use a balancing approach where they weigh one’s right to informational 
privacy against a state’s articulated interest for requesting or otherwise using 
the private information.274 This is mostly a rational basis test, which is the low-
est level of protection from governmental intrusions.275 Using a strict scrutiny 
test will mandate that the government show that the request for, or use of, pri-
vate information is for a compelling governmental interest and that it is using 
the least restrictive means in obtaining or using the information.276 For exam-
ple, the First Circuit, in Nunes, held that the prison officials did not have to 
look for an alternative means of distributing HIV-infected prisoners’ medicine 
such that the method of distribution would not disclose the prisoners’ HIV sta-
tus by requiring them to stand in a line to obtain the medicine.277 At a mini-
mum, that prison should have been required to show that there were no equal or 
less expensive means available to distribute the medicine without disclosing the 
inmates’ HIV status. 
To the extent that one would object to the use of strict scrutiny, then the re-
sponse could be that, given that the Fourth Amendment is the proper source for 
a constitutional right to informational privacy, and that the Fourth Amendment 
is one of the Bill of Rights Amendments, the constitutional right to informa-
tional privacy is a fundamental right278 which could support a strict scrutiny 
analysis when a person alleges a violation of her right to informational priva-
cy.279 
                                                        
274  See supra text accompanying note 203. 
275  Nunes v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 766 F.3d 136, 144 (1st Cir. 2014). See also supra note 
219 and accompanying text. 
276  Although a strict scrutiny standard might impose an added burden on states and their of-
ficials, that standard is needed, given the substantial and pervasive risk that each of us face 
from invasions of our privacy from governmental intrusions, and from private intrusions. 
Strict scrutiny is needed to ensure that state governments and their employees do their best 
job in determining whether one’s private information is really needed, and if needed, wheth-
er the least restrictive and minimally invasive means are used to obtain, use, and disclose the 
information. 
277  Nunes, 766 F.3d at 143–44. 
278  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). 
279  Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); see also supra note 199 
and accompanying text. In the criminal law search and seizure context, scholars disagree on 
whether courts should use strict scrutiny to resolve Fourth Amendment issues. See Wayne D. 
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Applying the above-stated concepts and analysis to the four possible viola-
tions that this Article discussed in Part I, one who has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in any of the four situations should be allowed to allege and litigate a 
violation of a constitutional right to informational privacy claim; this right ex-
tends to situations where the government requests the information for a job ap-
plication, public benefits, or other application for governmental services. And, 
one should have a similar claim when either the state government or the federal 
government improperly obtains private information from Facebook, Google or 
other social media providers, when the private information is such that the per-
son had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. The same claim 
should exist when governmental employees misuse private information for an 
unauthorized purpose, as well as when either the state or federal government, 
through too-pervasive surveillance, prevents the person from having a private 
existence.280 As long as the aggrieved person has a reasonable expectation of 
                                                                                                                                
Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant Require-
ment Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.U. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 540−41 (1997) (arguing that 
strict scrutiny should be required for “the warrant requirement” and “warrantless searches” 
“because Fourth Amendment rights are at least as fundamental as other rights which the 
Court closely scrutinizes”); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undo-
ing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 436 (1988) (“Adopting a strict 
scrutiny standard would fully bestow preferred status upon the fourth amendment as a fun-
damental right and in the process would yield a more structured reasonableness inquiry”). 
But see Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing 
Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1491 (2010). 
280  In United States v. Jones, 545 U.S. 400 (2012), the Court held that that the Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the 
vehicle’s movements, constituted a “search.” Id. at 404. Jones involved the Court’s use of 
the trespass approach to determine that the government’s attaching of a GPS device to a ve-
hicle was a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 406. Jones may be used to argue that 
a government entity’s pervasive surveillance can be a violation of one’s constitutional right 
to informational privacy, especially if the surveillance is too pervasive and if it involves digi-
tal devices. The Court stated:  
The concurrence posits that “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on pub-
lic streets” is okay, but that “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most of-
fenses” is no good. That introduces yet another novelty into our jurisprudence. There is no prec-
edent for the proposition that whether a search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime 
being investigated. And even accepting that novelty, it remains unexplained why a 4–week in-
vestigation is “surely” too long and why a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving substantial 
amounts of cash and narcotics is not an “extraordinary offens[e]” which may permit longer ob-
servation. What of a 2–day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6–
month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to grapple with these “vexing prob-
lems” in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be 
had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.  
Id. at 412–413 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Perhaps, one could argue that—
through the use of Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test (the same test for a constitu-
tional right to informational privacy)—the length and pervasiveness of governmental surveil-
lance and information gathering could be a violation of one’s constitutional right to informa-
tional privacy. This argument is especially appropriate when one did not know that a 
governmental entity was monitoring and gathering all or a substantial portion of his or her 
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daily existence—when the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy that such perva-
sive monitoring and information gathering was not occurring. 
As a matter of fact, during the editing of this Article, the Court, in Carpenter v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) opined on a related issue in a case involving a petitioner’s 
criminal conviction. Id. at 2211–13. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment required that 
the government obtain a warrant, on a showing of probable cause, before it could obtain 
one’s cell-site location information (CSLI) from cell phone service providers. Id. at 2221. 
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied because the petitioner had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the CSLI given the persistent and pervasive nature of the surveil-
lance:  
While individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones with them 
all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into pri-
vate residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales 
. . . . Accordingly, when the Government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near per-
fect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user. 
Id. at 2218. 
The Court further stated:  
Whoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been tailed every moment of every day 
for five years, and the police may—in the Government’s view—call upon the results of that sur-
veillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Only the few without cell 
phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance. 
Id. 
The Court was also concerned with the government’s being able to piece together a map of 
the petitioner’s entire existence during a certain period of time: “From the 127 days of loca-
tion data it received, the Government could, in combination with other information, deduce a 
detailed log of Carpenter’s movements, including when he was at the site of the robberies.” 
Id. Given the above, the Court held that, “Accordingly, when the Government accessed 
CSLI from the wireless carriers, it invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the whole of his physical movements.” Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court then held that the “third-party doctrine”—whereby the Court has previously held 
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply when law enforcement obtain information from a 
third party (such as a bank) instead of from a suspect—did not apply. Id. at 2220. The doc-
trine did not apply, in part, because of the type of information and the pervasiveness of the 
surveillance, given that such surveillance “is about a detailed chronicle of a person’s physi-
cal presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years.” Id. And, the Court as-
serted that because cell phone usage is “indispensable to participation in modern society” 
and because location information is automatically transmitted to wireless service providers, 
the transmitting of petitioner’s CSLI was not voluntary; and therefore, the third-party doc-
trine did not prevent the application of the Fourth Amendment. Id. As such, this Article fur-
ther argues that there are other conveyances of private information—including, but not lim-
ited to, one’s use of the internet—that are just as indispensable and pervasive as the use of 
one’s cell phone; and therefore, such conveyances should not be deemed either voluntary or 
subject to the third-party doctrine (which hopefully the Court will continue to erode as it did 
in Carpenter, as discussed above). 
Although Carpenter involves the application of the Fourth Amendment to a criminal prose-
cution, its analysis and holding should be applicable to a constitutional right to informational 
privacy claim, in the civil context, when such claim involves pervasive and persistent gov-
ernmental surveillance that intrudes on private information in which one has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, even when the surveillance involves the government’s patching to-
gether of different types of private information to create a map of one’s daily existence and 
even when that private information is in the hands of third parties. The application of the 
Fourth Amendment to the constitutional right to informational privacy is further appropriate 
because the reasonable expectation of privacy standard is used in both contexts; and there-
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privacy in the subject information, the government, when sued for a violation 
of the constitutional right to informational privacy, should have to show that 
the request for, demand for, or use of the information serves a compelling gov-
ernmental interest that could not be satisfied with less restrictive and less inva-
sive intrusions on, and use of, one’s private information.281 
CONCLUSION 
Today, citizens’ private information is subject to being obtained and used 
by a multiplicity of persons and entities. Some of the usage will be without 
one’s consent and the usage might disclose private information which is either 
embarrassing, or injurious to one’s reputation, future employability, and per-
sonal freedom. The disclosure or use could also lead to losses of privacy, and 
emotional distress deriving from the knowledge that one’s private information 
is no longer private. This Article discusses the constitutional right to informa-
tional privacy claim, and shows the confusion created by the Court’s misinter-
pretation of Whalen, its own precedent, and how the federal circuit courts have 
taken the lead in this area of the law. However, the law needs to be more uni-
form, and this Article, throughout its various sections, offers clarity and support 
for the most expansive approach to the claim, including the use of the Fourth 
Amendment and strict scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                                
fore, as this Article argues, that amendment should be the foundational constitutional support 
for a constitutional right to information privacy. See supra notes 25–85 and accompanying 
text; see also supra notes 182–269 and accompanying text. 
281  The specific methods or procedures used to bring a constitutional right to informational 
privacy claim are beyond the scope of this Article. However, such claims can be brought as 
section 1983 claims against state employees who are acting under color of state law when 
they commit a violation of one’s constitutional right to informational privacy. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2018); Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 2013) (resolving a section 
1983 claim—that alleged a violation of a constitutional right to informational privacy—on 
qualified immunity grounds). Perhaps, a Biven-type claim could be brought against a federal 
employee who violates one’s right to informational privacy. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). And, one might be able to 
bring the claim directly under the Fourth Amendment or under the “liberty” interest clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment or Fifth Amendment to seek an injunction or declaration that a 
certain statute or other procedure that mandates the disclosure of private information is a vio-
lation of the person’s constitutional right to informational privacy. 
